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A UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENT TO REGULATE AND MONITOR PRIVATE
MILITARY AND SECURITY CONTRACTORS
José L. Gómez del Prado *

ABSTRACT
Member States of the United Nations (U.N.) are responsible for taking
appropriate measures to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide effective
remedies for relevant misconduct of private military and security companies
(PMSCs) and their personnel; their responsibilities fully remain, even if States
have chosen to contract out certain security functions.
The widespread outsourcing of military and security functions to
private companies in situations of low-intensity conflicts, international relief,
and contingency operations has been a major phenomenon in the past twenty
years. The grave human rights violations in which they have been involved in
Iraq and Afghanistan have been the focus of international attention and have
generated debate about the roles of PMSCs, the norms under which they
should operate, and how to monitor their activities.
The U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Working Group)
has found that there is a regulatory legal vacuum covering the activities of
PMSCs and a lack of common standards for the registration and licensing of
these companies, for the vetting and training of their staff, and for the
safekeeping of weapons.
Although there are norms of international
humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) that could
apply in some situations, in practice, they have not been implemented. PMSCs
have succeeded in creating a situation of diffused responsibility and lack of
accountability through a labyrinth of contractual and insurance layers and
shells.
The Working Group has arrived at the logical conclusion that a new
binding international legal instrument is necessary to regulate and monitor the
*

Independent expert, Chairperson-Rapporteur, U.N. Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries.
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activities of PMSCs, and in 2010 it recommended to the U.N. the creation of
an open-ended working group entrusted with the elaboration of a regulatory
framework monitoring the activities of PMSCs.
The international instrument would stipulate, among other things, the
development of a national regime of licensing, regulation, and oversight of the
activities of PMSCs and their subcontractors; increased responsibility of home
States (where PMSCs are registered) for the export of military and security
services of PMSCs registered and licensed in their country; and that States on
whose territory PMSCs operate ensure effective control over the activities of
these companies.
KEY WORDS
U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC), U.N. Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries (Working Group), Private Military and Security Companies
(PMSCs), Violations of human rights, Immunity, Oversight, Accountability,
Regulation, Council of Europe, Swiss Initiative, Montreux Document,
International Code of Conduct, International Peace Operations Association
(IPOA), 1 British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC).
INTRODUCTION
The widespread outsourcing of military and security functions to
private military and security companies (PMSCs) by governments,
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and multinational
companies 2 in situations of low-intensity conflict, armed conflict, post conflict,
international relief, and contingency operations has been a major phenomenon
in recent years. The use of these private contractors to support operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the human rights violations in which they have been
involved have been the focus of international attention. It has generated debate
about the roles of PMSCs, the norms under which they should operate, and
how to monitor their activities.
In order to address these important issues at the national and
international level, the independent U.N. Working Group on the Use of
1

In November 2010, IPOA changed its name to International Stability Operations
Association (ISOA). About ISOA, INTERNATIONAL STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION (last
visited Apr. 13, 2011), http://ipoaworld.org/eng/aboutisoa.html.
2
The immovable target of transnational extractive companies is oil, gold, copper, cobalt,
diamonds, and a host of other minerals that a number of developing countries have in
abundance. The corporate desire to extract those minerals outweighs the risk of operating in an
unstable area, and the decision is made to go in. The need for security leads these
multinationals to rely on a number of private military and security companies (PMSCs) and
shady characters with whom they would not ordinarily do business. For example, the Canadian
company Ranger Oil relied on a band of mercenaries, called Executive Outcomes, to retake its
supply depot. See Madelaine Drohan, The High Risks of Operating Abroad, GLOBE AND MAIL,
Nov. 23, 2007, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com.
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Mercenaries (Working Group) 3 has recommended to the U.N. principles and
main elements as well as a text for a possible International Convention on the
Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security
Companies. Its recommendations are contained in two separate reports: the
first was submitted in July 2010 to the HRC 4 at Geneva and the second to the
General Assembly’s Third Committee in August 2010. 5
The main aims of the proposed Convention are to reaffirm and
strengthen the State responsibility in the monopoly of the legitimate use of
force, identify those inherently State functions which cannot be outsourced to
PMSCs under any circumstances, and to limit PMSCs’ use of force and
firearms according to international human rights standards.
The new Convention would stipulate the development of a national
regime of licensing, regulation, and oversight of the activities of PMSCs and
their subcontractors; increased responsibility of home States (where PMSCs
are registered) for the export of military and security services of PMSCs
registered and licensed in their country; and that States on whose territory
PMSCs operate ensure effective control over the activities of these companies.
The new Convention would also provide for the establishment of an
International Register of PMSCs under which States would have to report
annually on imports and exports of military and security services of PMSCs
and standardize information on PMSCs registered in and licensed by the State
party. This obligation to share information on companies in an open and
transparent way would provide greater public and parliamentary scrutiny. An
international committee would monitor the measures taken by State parties to
implement the Convention.
The proposed Convention would apply not only to States but also to
intergovernmental organizations, within the limits of their competence, with
respect to PMSCs, their activities, and their personnel. It would apply to all
situations where PMSCs deploy their activities, regardless of whether the
situation is considered to constitute an armed conflict or not.
3

The U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (Working Group), established in
2005, is composed of five independent experts who provide their advice on a pro bono basis.
There is one expert for each of the following geopolitical regions of the world: Africa, Asia
and the Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western and Others
Groups.
4
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 5, 2010) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado)
(proposing a draft Convention, for consideration and action by the HRC) [hereinafter July 5
Working Group Report].
5
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Report of the Working Group on the use of
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of
peoples to self-determination, ¶¶18–30, (2010) transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/65/325 (Aug. 25, 2010) (proposing a framework for an international draft
convention on the regulation and monitoring of PMSCs,). See also Draft Convention infra
Annex I (where the draft has been reproduced).
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CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

PMSCs are the modern reincarnation of a long lineage of private
providers of physical force, including corsairs, privateers, and mercenaries. 6
Mercenaries, which had practically disappeared during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, reappeared in the 1960s during the decolonization period
operating mainly in Africa and Asia. Under U.N. auspices, a Convention was
adopted which outlawed and criminalized their activities. 7
The current international political system, constituted in the twentieth
century under the U.N. Charter, is based on a community of sovereign States.
This is a modern concept originating in the Peace of Westphalia, signed in
1648, which laid the basis of what constitutes a sovereign a State, namely its
capacity to defend its frontiers by an army and to control domestic public order
through law enforcement. The concept of the nation State was later defined in
the nineteenth century by Max Weber, a German sociologist. 8
In the course of the last two hundred years, the trend in Western
countries towards strengthening the legitimate use of force as a public service
seems to have been inverted. The notion of State monopoly on the legitimate
use of force has evolved among Western countries in recent years during the
period of anarchical globalization following the collapse of the USSR. An
important change in the democracies of Western countries has operated with
regard to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the context of the
anarchical globalization of the world economy that followed the collapse of the
USSR. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reduction of national armies and
the globalization of the economy, the private military and security industry
exploded into a powerful global phenomenon. The annual market revenue of
the staggering security industry is estimated to be over $100 billion. 9
In the last twenty years there has been, primarily in Western European
and North American countries and particularly in the U.S. and the U.K., a
significant increase in PMSCs. PMSCs have operated in zones of lowintensity armed conflict and post-conflict situations such as Afghanistan, the
Balkans, Central Africa, Colombia, Democratic Rep. of Congo, Iraq, Somalia,
and the Sudan. 10 They also provide services for the extractive industries which
have been able to operate in such zones of instability. Parallel to this
6

Hin-Yan Liu, Leashing the Corporate Dogs of War: The Legal Implications of the Modern
Private Military Company, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L., 141–168 (2010).
7
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries art. 1, December 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 75
8
MAX W EBER, T HE T HEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC O RGANIZATION 102 (1964).
9
P. W. S INGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS: T HE R ISE OF THE P RIVATIZED M ILITARY
INDUSTRY 78 (2004).
10
See, José L. Gómez del Prado, Private Military and Security Companies and Challenges
to the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries 5 (Conference on Private Military
Contractors
in
Latin
America,
Conference
Paper),
available
at
http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008.

4

5

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

2011

privatization of warfare at the international level, there has also been increased
demand for private security and protection of property at the domestic level all
over the world. 11 Some PMSCs also pose a threat to democracy itself as is
shown by the activities of companies like Blackwater (now renamed as Xe)
and its subsidiaries or affiliates, such as Total Intelligence, which “sought to
become the ‘intel arm’ of Monsanto, offering to provide operatives to infiltrate
activist groups organizing against the multinational biotech firm.” 12
Today we are witnessing more and more the outsourcing of the use of
force to the private sector as one commercial commodity, among others. This
new trend to privatize security is generalizing and has already reached the U.N.
Secretariat itself, which has envisaged outsourcing security functions in some
given situations. Indeed, despite internal criticism, the U.N. has been one of the
latest nonprofit organizations to outsource security functions to PMSCs.
Foreign Policy Magazine reports that the U.N. has been in consultations with a
British security firm to send additional security forces to protect them in
Afghanistan. 13 The U.N.’s top security official, Gregory Starr, has also been
advocating an increase in the use of private security firms in Pakistan, where
U.N. relief workers have been the target of kidnappings and killings, according
to U.N. officials. 14
In many countries the number of private security personnel per 100,000
inhabitants is much larger than the active police. Among these countries are;
Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
11

Herbert Wulf, Reconstructing the Public Monopoly of Legitimate Force, in P RIVATE
ACTORS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE 87, 92 (Alan Bryden & Marina Caparini eds., 2006).
12
See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater’s Black Ops, T HE N ATION, Sept. 15, 2010,
http://www.thenation.com/article/154739/blackwaters-black-ops. The article references T HE
NEW YORK T IMES ’ Sept. 3, 2010, report that Blackwater had “created a web of more than 30
shell companies or subsidiaries in part to obtain millions of dollars in American government
contracts after the security company came under intense criticism for reckless conduct in Iraq.”
This phenomenon is not unique to Western countries but has spread all over the world. In Peru,
for instance, the Working Group was seized with a complaint of a human rights organization
GRUFIDES (Sustainable Development Training and Action Group). Three Catholic priests
and members of their families and forty local representatives and environmental leaders from
farming communities, after having made a complaint for alleged violations of their rights by
the mining company Yanacocha, were tailed and spied on by physical and electronic means;
undercover approaches and infiltration; and slander, threats, and intimidation with the aim of
intimidating victims, breaking them down psychologically and damaging their reputation by
running slander campaigns. See also Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the
Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of
Peoples to Self-Determination, Addendum Mission to Peru, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.2 (Feb.
4, 2008) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado) for a discussion of the Group’s Mission to Peru,
conducted Jan. 29 to Feb. 2, 2007.
13
See Colum Lynch, U.N. Embraces Private Military Contractors, T URTLE B AY:
REPORTING
FROM
INSIDE
THE
UNITED
N ATIONS
(Jan.
17,
2010),
http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/17/un_embraces_private_military_contractor.
14
See Amol Mehra, Ensuring Accountability through Supporting the Draft Convention on
PMSCs, R IGHTRESPECT (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.rightrespect.com/2010/09/07/ensuringaccountability-through-supporting-the-draft-convention-on-pmscs/.
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Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg,
Panama, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Turkey
and the U.S. 15
The problem of accountability of PMSC personnel becomes even more
complex when private military contractors are used by international
organizations, such as the U.N., the E.U., or NATO. The concept of
institutional responsibility of intergovernmental organizations is still elusive
and should prompt the U.N. to take precautionary measures to ensure that if
and when it outsources its security and protection functions, it does so in
accordance with its own Charter. 16
Two philosophies confront Member States of the U.N. in such
important matters as the sovereignty of States and the impact of outsourcing
the legitimate use of force to private contractors without regulatory and
monitoring mechanisms. 17
The position of Western countries in the U.N. has been a rejection of
regulation and oversight mechanisms. Their position is understandable since
the new booming and flourishing security industry is located in Western
countries and particularly in the U.K. and the U.S. where seventy percent of
PMSCs are found. Their position, however, does not appear justifiable since
the aim of the new binding legal instrument is not to ban PMSCs, which at the
present stage seems unrealistic. Confronted with the contemporary reality of
the abrogation of fundamental responsibilities of governments, the U.N.
Working Group has taken a pragmatic approach. With an aggregated estimate
of contracts of over $100 billion per year, the private military and security
industry has become a ubiquitous reality. 18 In addition, many of these PMSCs
15

See, e.g. Private Security Personnel Now Outnumber Police, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF
CRIMINOLOGY (July 20, 2009), http://www.aic.gov.au/media/2009/july/20090720.aspx. See
also NICOLAS FLORQUIN, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011: STATES OF SECURITY (forthcoming
2011). See also Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Report of the Working Group on
the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the
right of peoples to self-determination, ¶¶ 13–16, (2010) transmitted by Note of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/65/325 (Aug. 25, 2010).
16
The Draft Convention proposed by the U.N. Working Group would apply not only to
States but also to intergovernmental organizations. See Draft Convention infra Annex I.
17
Within this context, it is interesting to note the concern in Switzerland of academics and
public opinion in general regarding the existing legal vacuum with respect to PMSCs. The
issue has been subject to debate in Switzerland following the recent relocation to Basel of the
headquarters of the British firm Aegis Defence Services. There are currently no Swiss laws
governing the activities of such firms. See Un Vide Juridique Profite aux Armées Privées, TSR
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.tsr.ch/info/monde/2358789-hamid-karzai-veut-degager-lesarmees-privees.html.
18
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7 (Jan. 9, 2008) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado).
See also SOURCEWATCH, www.sourcewatch.org for information on the conduct of
transnational corporations related to human rights and social responsibility.
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“walk a fine line of legality, with potentially illegitimate clients, business
practices, and employees with dark pasts.” 19 The recent case of a former
Blackwater employee contracted by the CIA who killed two Pakistanis is a
clear illustration of these practices. 20 The main purpose of regulatory and
monitoring mechanisms is to establish minimum national and international
standards for States in order to regulate the activities of PMSCs and their
personnel and set up an international oversight mechanism given the negative
impact of their activities on the enjoyment of human rights.
In addition to the negative impact PMSCs may have on the enjoyment
of human rights, there is also the need to distinguish clearly the contractor’s
activities from those of other non-State entities such as mercenaries, praetorian
guards, paramilitaries, proxy armies, or undercover operations agents. We are
facing situations very much like those of the sixteenth to eighteenth century
involving pirates, corsairs, filibusters, privateers, and buccaneers. 21
These non-State entities of the twenty-first century operate in extremely
blurred situations where delineation of the appropriate role for military and that
of civilians is unclear. The new security industry of private companies moves
large quantities of weapons and military equipment. It provides services for
military operations recruiting former soldiers as civilians to carry out passive
or defensive security. According to the interpretation of some legal experts of
the International Committee of the Red Cross, only a small number of PMSC
employees operating in armed conflict or post-conflict situations could be
considered as combatants, some as mercenaries, and the majority as civilians
who would lose protection under IHL when taking “direct part in hostilities.” 22
Neither the Geneva Conventions nor the Additional Protocols define
direct participation in hostilities. A further clarification has been given in the
Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
under International Humanitarian Law, which indicates that the widespread
19

P. W. S INGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS: T HE R ISE OF THE P RIVATIZED M ILITARY
INDUSTRY ix (2004).
20
Tom Raum, Pakistan, US Still at Impasse over Jailed CIA Man, S ALON.COM (Feb. 23,
2011), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2011/02/23/pakistan_us_cia_impasse. See also
Justin Elliott, CIA Man in Pakistan May Not Have Immunity, S ALON.COM (Feb. 23, 2011),
www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/02/23.
21
The 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law states in Article 1: “Privateering is,
and remains, abolished.” Declaration of Paris (Apr. 16, 1856), in CONVENTIONS AND
DECLARATIONS BETWEEN THE P OWERS CONCERNING W AR, ARBITRATION AND
NEUTRALITY 10 (1915) available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/105?OpenDocument.
The 1907 Hague Convention Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships
further expands on this rule. Article 1 of the Convention stipulates, “A merchant ship
converted into a war-ship cannot have the rights and duties accruing to such vessels unless it is
placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power whose
flag it flies.” Convention Relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships (1907)
in J AMES BROWN SCOTT, 2 T HE HAGUE P EACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 423
(1909), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/210?OpenDocument.
22
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies
and International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 525, 532, 539, 568 (2006).
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contracting out to the private sector of military functions has blurred the
distinction between legitimate military targets and persons protected under IHL
against direct attacks. 23 The Guidance mentions that these difficulties are
aggravated where armed actors do not distinguish themselves from the civilian
population, which is increasingly the case. It further states that, under IHL,
PMSCs and their employees are subjected to the same criteria as for any other
civilians: they are entitled to protection against direct attacks “unless and for
such time as they directly participate in hostilities, even though their activities
and location may expose them to an increased risk of incidental injury and
death.” 24 However, this does not exclude the possibility that domestic law
might govern the status of PMSCs and their employees differently from IHL
for other situations than the conduct of hostilities. 25
Although the status of PMSC personnel under IHL is complex, and
despite the interpretative clarifications provided by experts of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, it appears that there is a vacuum in IHL. It is
very hard to believe that in some situations, these individuals can be
considered civilians, given that they carry and use weapons, interrogate
prisoners, load bombs, drive military trucks, and fulfill other essential military
functions. Those who are armed can easily switch from a passive/defensive to
an active/offensive role and can commit human rights violations and even
destabilize governments. They cannot be considered soldiers or supporting
militias under IHL either, since they are not part of the army or in the chain of
command and often belong to a large number of different nationalities.
Two concrete examples may enlighten the readers about the blurred
situations and the osmosis which operates among these non-State entities. The
first case concerns Simon Mann and Nick du Toit and their involvement in the
attempted coup against President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea in 2004. 26 The
second example is the case of the Israeli mercenary Yair Klein convicted by a
court in Colombia for training several members of Colombian paramilitary
groups and militias of drug traffickers during the 1980s and 1990s. 27
Both Simon Mann and Nick du Toit had previously been working
“legally” for the PMSC Executive Outcomes, which operated in Angola and

23

Nils Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
under International Humanitarian Law, 90(872) INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 991, 1015
(2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf
(adopted by the Assembly of the International Committee of the Red Cross in February 2009).
24
Id. at 1035.
25
Id. at 1012.
26
Tracy McVeigh, Ex-Mercenary Nick du Toit Tells of His Five Years in a “Living Hell”
and Why He is Ashamed of War, THE OBSERVER (June 13, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/13/simon-mann-mercenary-renounces-war.
27
Yasha Levine, Yair Klein: Russia’s “Other” Viktor Bout, THE EXILE, 1 (March 28, 2008),
http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=17982&IBLOCK_ID=35.

8

9

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

2011

Sierra Leone, providing military and security services, among other things, to
the rebels, extractive companies, and the national army. 28
Yair Klein is a former colonel of the Israeli Army. Since he retired he
has been an arms dealer in Lebanon and has trained the Medellín Cartel in
Colombia. 29 In Sierra Leone, he sold weapons to the belligerents. 30 He has
provided teaching and instruction to a number of non-State entities such as
paramilitary groups in military and counterinsurgency techniques. 31 In
February 2001, he was convicted by the Criminal Court of the Manizales
District, Colombia for “instruction in and teaching of military and terrorist
tactics, techniques and methods, committed with mercenaries and
accomplices” and sentenced in absentia to ten years in prison. 32 The
Colombian government made unsuccessful attempts to obtain his extradition
from Israel. 33 In March 2007, Interpol issued an international arrest warrant
for Mr. Klein, who was subsequently arrested in August 2007 in the Moscow
airport and placed in custody until his transfer to Colombia, which had
requested extradition. The authorization to extradite Klein was given by a
Russian tribunal. However, the European Court of Human Rights decided to
suspend the extradition procedure and ruled on April 1, 2010, that the
implementation of the extradition order would give rise to a violation of
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 34
PMSCs and their personnel (“private soldiers”) could be categorized as
combatants if they formed part of militias party to the conflict and fulfilled
conditions provided in IHL, particularly in Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention 35 and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 36 which
only applies to “armed conflicts.” For that they would have to fulfill a number
of conditions such as to: (a) be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
28

See Elizabeth Day and Katherine Houreld, A Boy’s Own Story Gone Very Wrong, THE
TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
29,
2004),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/1470458/ABoys-Own-story-gone-very-wrong.html; Emprenden Estrategia Juridica Para Obtener
Extradicion Del Mercenario Yair Klein Desde Rusa, ELTIEMPO.COM (Nov. 11, 2008),
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-4659846.
29
Levine, supra note 26, at 1.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Klein v. Russia, Application No. 24268/08, Eur. Ct. of H.R., ¶ 8 (Apr. 1, 2010).
33
See Day, supra note 27; Emprenden supra note 27.
34
Klein, supra note 31, ¶ 1, 18.
35
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention refers to “persons who accompany the armed forces without being members
thereof, such as…supply contractors.” See also Alexandre Faite, Involvement of Private
Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications Under Internationall Humanitarian Law, INT’L
COMM. RED CROSS (2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/pmc-article-a-faite.pdf.
36
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict art. 83, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter AP I].
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(c) carry arms openly; and (d) conduct their operations in accordance with the
laws of war. 37 The term “combatant” is frequently used, but, according to IHL,
the status of combatant does not exist in non-international armed conflicts.
In general, these conditions are not fulfilled by PMSCs and their
employees. Not only do they violate the laws of war by making use of
excessive force and shooting indiscriminately, resulting in civilian casualties,
they also use forbidden arms or experimental ammunition prohibited by
international law—even white phosphorous. 38 Often, they circulate without
identification and drive in unidentified sport utility vehicles (SUVs) with tinted
glasses and no plates, behaving similarly to infamous death squads. 39 In
Afghanistan and Iraq, the staff of PMSCs “has been extremely difficult to
identify.” 40 Local populations have not had the means to file a complaint with
the authorities or the contracting State. 41
In accordance with Article 50 of Protocol I, in an international armed
conflict, “persons that are not categorized as members of the armed forces of a
party to the conflict are civilians.” 42 As civilians, “private contractors are
[thus] protected against direct attacks ‘unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in the hostilities.’” 43 Whether they carry a weapon or not does not
imply per se that they take direct part in the hostilities. 44
Under IHL, “direct participation in the hostilities is not restricted to
situations where individuals are involved in military deployment or are armed
with a view to taking an active part in combat operations. In other words, one
should not assume that direct participation is necessarily restricted to a
minority” of PMSCs. 45 The Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols do not provide a definition of “direct participation in hostilities.”
However, the commentary on Additional Protocol I indicates that “‘direct’
participation means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to
cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed
forces.” 46 This Commentary raises a number of questions as to the activities
which are presently entrusted to PMSCs in situations of armed conflicts. 47
37

Third Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 4(A)(2).
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7 (Jan. 9, 2008) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado).
39
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Alexandre Faite, Involvement of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications
Under Internationall Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS 7 (2004),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/pmc-article-a-faite.pdf.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 619 (1987).
See also Nils Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
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While there are a number of logistical activities performed by private
contractors, such as food or laundry services, plumbing, etc., which may not
fall under direct participation in the hostilities, there are many other activities
performed by PMSCs such as transportation of weapons and other military
commodities, intelligence, strategic planning, or procurement of arms, for
which they may lose the protection afforded to civilians under IHL. In the
U.S. Naval Handbook, intelligence is classified as direct participation in
hostilities.48 When PMSCs take a direct part in the hostilities, private
contractors that are categorized as civilians lose their protection but only for
the duration of such direct participation. 49
Under IHL, an attack against civilian objects such as schools, hospitals,
civilian houses, etc., guarded by PMSCs would be illegal, and personnel
providing security to it would be entitled to the protection afforded to civilians.
The situation is different for those situations in which PMSCs provide security
to a military facility, a trend that we have increasingly witnessed in recent
years.
In situations of armed conflict, it is arguable that guarding
infrastructures such as army bases, barracks or ammunition dumps constitutes
in itself a direct participation in the hostilities. The U.S. Air Force
Commander’s Handbook, for instance, provides that “anyone acting as a guard
for military activity’’ is subject to attack as long as they are on duty. 50
Therefore, private contractors would not be entitled to the protection afforded
to the civilian population under humanitarian law and would not be immune
from direct attack.” 51
One may raise the questions as to whether power plants, oil sites, or
airports qualify as legitimate targets and what the implications would be for
personnel of PMSCs guarding such entities. Would they be immune from
military attack or would they lose the protection afforded to civilians under
IHL? This situation is very different from the case illustrated above, where
PMSCs are providing security to a military infrastructure. “Indeed, whilst it is
arguable that providing security to an army base is per se a direct participation
in the hostilities, guarding a pipeline or a power plant is not.” 52
In addition, these “private soldiers” operate in all types of situations
and not only in “armed conflicts” covered under IHL. The scope of the
proposed draft Convention by the Working Group is precisely to apply “to all
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90(872) INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS
991, 1020 n.114 (2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872reports-documents.pdf (“‘direct’ participation means acts of war which by their nature or
purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed
forces.”)
47
Faite, supra note 41.
48
DEPT. OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS ¶ 8.2.2 (2007).
49
Faite, supra note 41.
50
Id. at 8.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 9.
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situations whether or not the situation is qualified as an armed conflict.” 53 For
instance, the situation in Iraq is more a situation of post-conflict than that of an
“armed conflict” according to IHL. These “private soldiers” exist in a grey
area in many situations in that they are neither civilians nor combatants.
Rather, these “private soldiers” may be considered “unlawful combatants,”
similar in legitimacy to paramilitaries and terrorists. 54
The new industry also provides a number of inherently State functions
such as military support and military counseling that have been outsourced by
States, which do not require private contractors to carry weapons, such as
interrogations, intelligence tasks, and the transport of military supplies, such as
weapons, ammunition, and petrol. 55
From a political perspective, inherently State functions refer to the
monopoly of the legitimate use of force by the public authorities, namely the
army and the police, in a given territory. This notion has its origin in the
Treaty of Westphalia and is linked to the sovereignty of a State. It was
developed later by Weber in his concept of the nation-state. 56 In the twentieth
century, the concept of inherently State functions has, in some cases, been
widened to include not only the monopoly of the use of force by a nation but
also a number of other functions of the public sector over which the State
should have control. Under such an approach, in order to safeguard its
sovereignty, the State should control such sectors as energy, transportation, the
banking sector, education, and health. This has been the approach of many
Western European socialists, communists, and those who fought in the French
resistance during the Second World War for a more just society. 57 In other
cases, many of these functions are contracted out from the public sector to the
private sector. This movement has gained momentum with the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. that followed.
The policy and strategies of the Bush Administration at the beginning
of the 21st century have further shaken the Weberian concept of the monopoly
53

See Draft Convention, infra Annex I, scope.
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶¶ 24, 25, 32, 57, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7 (Jan. 9, 2008) (by José Luis Gómez
del Prado).
55
Id. ¶¶ 23–51.
56
MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1964).
57
This scope is also embodied in Article 1, common to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which stipulates: “1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development; 2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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of the State on the legitimate use of force, in particular with the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, in order to be able to fight in several war
theaters, the Bush Administration relied on outsourcing or contracting out to
the private sector a number of traditionally public functions. In Afghanistan
and Iraq, for instance, instead of sending more troops, the Bush Administration
largely relied on private contractors not only for the logistics but also for a
number of military and security functions carried out by private contractors.
Additionally, in order to maintain the Pax Americana in Afghanistan, the Bush
Administration relied on warlords paid by the CIA, which provided them with
cash and weapons to do America’s job. 58 The notion of the monopoly on the
legitimate use of force as well as the concept of nation-building or institutionbuilding (post-conflict peace-building), conceptualized in the 1990s in the
U.N. Agenda for Peace, have been broken down by these policies. 59
Futhermore, it should be noted that contracting out functions, which may be
considered inherently State functions, does not relieve States from their
responsibility under international law. 60
In the U.S., a number of congressional leaders have expressed great
concern, as discussed in this article, 61 about the situation of contracting out
military and security functions that should remain in the public sector, and they
have proposed, without success so far, bills to remedy this situation. These
bills have attempted to restore military functions to the public sector. In other
words, these legislative efforts would put the U.S. government back on the
path of conducting inherent State functions through the U.S. military and
prohibiting the use of PMSCs for such activities as security, law enforcement,
and intelligence.
Under U.S. law, an “inherently governmental function is one that, as a
matter of law and policy, must be performed by federal government employees
and cannot be contracted out because it is ‘intimately related to the public
interest.’” 62 There exist two main definitions of “inherently governmental
functions” within federal law and policy:
One is a statutory definition, enacted as part of the Federal
Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998. This
definition States that an inherently governmental function is ‘a
58

AHMED R ASHID, DESCENT INTO C HAOS: T HE U.S. AND THE F AILURE OF N ATION
B UILDING IN P AKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA 133–137 (2008).
59
See U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-keeping, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111 (June 17, 1992).
60
See INT’L L. COMM’N, DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL
ACTS,
art.
5,
8
(2001),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
61
See Part B of this article for a discussion about the Stop Outsourcing Security Act.
62
J OHN R. LUCKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40641, INHERENTLY
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS: B ACKGROUND,
AND
OPTIONS
FOR
CONGRESS
i
(2010),
available
at
ISSUES
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40641.pdf.
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function so intimately related to the public interest as to require
performance by Federal Government employees.’ The other is a
policy-oriented definition contained in Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. This definition States that an
inherently governmental activity is ‘an activity that is so
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by government personnel.’ Other statutes and
regulations that define inherently governmental functions do so
either by reproducing the language of the FAIR Act or OMB
Circular A-76, or by incorporating the definitions of the FAIR
Act or OMB Circular A-76 by reference. 63
Although there is no consensus in the international community
regarding “inherently State functions,” the Working Group is recommending in
its proposed draft Convention on PMSCs, a number of functions intrinsically
linked to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force for study and discussion
among Member States of the U.N. with the objective of reaching an agreement
and the adoption of a regulatory framework of the PMSCs. These functions
are,
consistent with the principle of the State monopoly on the
legitimate use of force which a State cannot outsource or
delegate to PMSCs under any circumstances. Among such
functions are direct participation in hostilities, waging war
and/or combat operations, taking prisoners, law-making,
espionage, intelligence, knowledge transfer with military,
security and policing application, use of and other activities
related to weapons of mass destruction and police powers,
especially the powers of arrest or detention including the
interrogation of detainees and other functions that a State Party
considers as inherently State functions. 64
The PMSC industry is transnational in nature and is growing very
rapidly, particularly since the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The
availability of experienced security and military personnel for hire has enabled
governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to
get around political constraints that otherwise might limit the use of force. 65 In
addition, since private military contractors are not considered to be part of a
State’s armed forces, or a supporting militia under IHL, governments avoid
responsibility for the tasks that they contract out to PMSCs and for the acts
63

Id.
Draft Convention, infra Annex I, art. 2.
65
See Yves Engler, La privatization de l’occupation: Les mercanaries et les ONG
RECTO
VERSO
(Mar.
9,
2010),
(Counterpunch),
HAITI
http://haitirectoverso.blogspot.com/2010_09_08_archive.html.
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committed by the employees of the PMSCs. Thus, the position of the U.S.
government, in addition to the problem of extraterritoriality, is that “as a
general matter, acts committed by individuals must have the necessary
participation of government to formally be considered as a human rights
violation.” 66 This has also been a way of hiding the real number of casualties
of low-intensity armed conflicts from the public. 67
In 2005, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the predecessor of
the present HRC, created an independent Working Group of five experts to
study, identify, and monitor emerging issues, manifestations, and trends
regarding mercenaries and the activities of PMSCs, and their impact on human
rights, particularly on the right of peoples to self-determination. The Working
Group was also requested to present concrete proposals on possible new
standards and general guidelines or basic principles encouraging the further
protection of human rights. 68 Since then, the HRC and the General Assembly
have reiterated and expanded the mandate given to the independent experts of
the Working Group.
In order to assess the impact of PMSCs on human rights, the Working
Group has conducted nine field missions in the past five years: in countries
exporting PMSC’s activities (U.K. and U.S.); countries importing those
services (Afghanistan), 69 or countries from which third nationals are contracted
to be sent to conflict, post-conflict, or low intensity armed situations (Chili,
Ecuador, Fiji, Honduras, Peru), 70 and countries where former employees of
PMSCs have carried out mercenary activities (Equatorial Guinea). The
Working Group also conducted a nine day mission to South Africa on
November 10, 2010. Its report will be issued in 2011.
At the end of its visit to South Africa, the Working Group held a press
conference during which it pointed out that since the period bringing an end to
apartheid in 1994, South Africans had been widely employed by PMSCs
operating around the world. 71 It commended South Africa as one of the first
countries to adopt legislation on the provision of foreign military assistance in
66

See Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N.
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means
of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶ 51., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7 (Jan. 9, 2008) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado)
[hereinafter Jan. 9 Working Group Report].
67
See Steven L. Schooner & Colin D. Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice, 16-18
(George Washington Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 512, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677506.
68
See G.A. Res. 2005/2, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/2 (Apr. 7, 2005).
69
Press Release, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Why Private Military and Security
Companies Should be Regulated (Aug. 2010), http://198.170.85.29/Gomez-del-Prado-articleon-regulation-of-private-and-military-firms-3-Sep-2010.pdf.
70
See Jan. 9 Working Group Report, supra note 65.
71
See Press Release, High Commissioner for Human Rights, South Africa: UN Experts to
Discuss the Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies, (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10515&LangID=E.
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1998. 72 Nonetheless, the regulatory regime established in South Africa for
PMSCs and individuals operating in different countries have faced challenges
in terms of implementation. The Working Group recommended that the
government undertake the necessary steps to ensure that the regulatory regime
envisaged in the legislation be strengthened and include a monitoring
mechanism. 73 In particular, the Working Group emphasized the important role
of effective implementation of the legislation of the National Conventional
Arms Control Committee, which has been given the responsibility to authorize
the export of military and security services to regulated countries. 74
The Working Group has reviewed a large number of allegations of
human rights violations committed by employees of these companies. In the
cluster of human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by employees of
PMSCs, which the Working Group has examined, one can find summary
executions, acts of torture, cases of arbitrary detention, trafficking of persons,
serious health damages caused by their activities, as well as attempts against
the right of self-determination. It also appears that PMSCs, in their search for
profit, neglect security, do not provide their employees with their basic rights,
and often put their staff in situations of danger and vulnerability. 75

72

Id.
Press Release, U.N. Information Centres, South Africa Should Pursue its efforts to
Strengthen the Regulatory Framework for Private Military and Security Companies, Say UN
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See Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N.
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means
of Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, Addendum,
Communications to and from Governments, ¶ 90, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.1 (Feb. 13, 2008)
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Cluster of Human Rights Violations

The following paragraphs are indicative of some of the grave human rights
violations committed by personnel of PMSCs.
Summary Executions
There are also concerns over the activities and approach of PMSC
personnel, their convoys of armored vehicles and their conduct in traffic, in
particular their use of lethal force. On September 16, 2007 in Baghdad,
employees of the U.S.-based firm Blackwater were involved in a shooting
incident in which seventeen civilian were killed and more than twenty other
civilians were wounded including women and children. Local eyewitness
accounts indicate the use of small arms and rocket fire from a helicopter
belonging to this company. 76 This incident was not the first of its kind and not
the first involving Blackwater. In Najaf, in April 2004, and on several other
occasions, employees of this company took part in direct hostilities. In May
2007, another incident involving the same company reportedly occurred
involving guards belonging to the company and forces belonging to the Iraqi
Ministry of the Interior allegedly exchanged gunfire in a sector of Baghdad. 77
Even though charges were filed against Blackwater, the federal prosecutors
76

See Mike Baker, In Shift, Blackwater Dumps Tarnished Brand Name, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.truth-out.org/021409B.
77
See Bernhard Zand, Blackwater’s Hail of Gunfire, DER SPIEGEL (Sept. 24, 2007),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,507513,00.html.
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were not able to overcome the complexities inherent in investigating events
that occurred in war zones. 78
In central Baghdad, two Armenian women, Genevia Antranick and
Mary Awanis were killed on October 9, 2007, when their car came too close to
a protected convoy. Reports indicate that employees belonging to the private
security company, Unity Resources Group (URG), fired approximately
nineteen to twenty rounds of ammunition before leaving the scene. 79 In its
statement, URG said its security team was approached at a high speed by a
vehicle which did not stop despite warnings that included hand signals, signal
flares and a warning shot in the radiator, and that the guards opened fire when
the car kept rolling. 80 The family of Genevia Antranick was offered no
compensation and has begun court proceedings against URG in the U.S. 81
The firm was also involved in the shooting of 72-year-old Australian
Kays Juma. Professor Juma was shot in March 2006 as he approached an
intersection being blockaded for a convoy that URG was protecting. 82 At 10:00
am, Professor Juma, a 25-year resident of Baghdad, who drove through the city
every day, allegedly sped up his vehicle as he approached the guards and did
not heed warnings to stop, including hand signals, flares, warning shots into
the body of his car, and floodlights. 83
Torture
Seventy two Iraqi citizens, who were formerly detained at military
prisons in Iraq, have sued L-3 Services, Inc. (L-3), a private military contractor
which provided civilian translators for U.S. military forces in Iraq, and Adel
Nakhla, a former employee of L-3 who served as one of its translators there
under the Alien Tort Statute. 84 The citizens allege having been tortured and
physically and mentally abused during their detention and that L-3 and Nakhla
should be held liable for their actions. The plaintiffs assert twenty causes of
action, among them: torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, assault,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 85
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See James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater Are Collapsing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/world/21contractors.html?pagewanted=all.
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2008 Working Group Communications Report, supra note 74, ¶ 7; See also José Luis
Gómez del Prado, The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and Security
Companies (PMSC), CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION (November 8, 2010),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=21826.
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2008 Working Group Communications Report, supra note 74, ¶ 7.
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Jessicah Mendes & Scott Mitchell, Who is Unity Resources Group? ABC NEWS
AUSTRALIA (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/09/15/3012146.htm.
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Defendants filed motions to dismiss on a number of grounds. 86 They
argued, among others,
that the suit must be dismissed in its entirety because they are
immune under the laws of war, because the suit raises nonjusticiable political questions, and because they possess
derivative sovereign immunity. They [sought] dismissal of the
state law claims on the basis of government contractor
immunity, premised on the notion that Plaintiffs cannot proceed
on state law claims which arise out of combatant activities of
the military. 87
Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the district of Maryland
Greenbelt Division decided to proceed with the case against L-3 Services. It
did not accept the motions and is allowing the case to go forward. 88
Arbitrary Detention
A number of media reports have indicated that private security guards
have played a central role in some of the most sensitive activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), such as the arbitrary detention and clandestine
raids against alleged insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, 89 the involvement in
CIA rendition flights, 90 and joint covert operations. 91 Employees of PMSCs
would have been involved in the taking of detainees from “pick-up points”
(such as Tuzla, Islamabad or Skopje), transporting them with rendition flights,
delivering them to drop-off points (such as Cairo, Rabat, Bucharest, Amman or
Guantanamo), as well as in the construction, equipping and staffing of the
CIA’s “black sites.” 92
Within this context, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a
lawsuit in May 2007 against Jeppesen DataPlan Inc. (a subsidiary company of
Boeing) on behalf of five persons who were kidnapped by the CIA,
86
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A/HRC/15/25/Add.3 (June 15, 2010) (by Shaista Shameem).
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TIMES
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disappearing in overseas “dark prisons” maintained by the U.S. 93 Jeppesen
would have participated in the rendition by providing flight planning and
logistical support. On September 8, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint of five
foreign nationals alleging that Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc. (Jeppesen) had violated
the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, by assisting in their forced
disappearance and torture by the CIA. 94 In so doing, the court overturned a
three-judge panel decision finding that the state secrets doctrine did not
warrant immediate dismissal of the case. 95
Health
The 2009 annual report of DynCorp International refers to four lawsuits
concerning the spraying of narcotic plant crops along the Colombian border
adjacent to Ecuador on behalf of three Ecuadorian provinces and 3,266
plaintiffs. 96
The 2009 DynCorp report states:
The aerial spraying operations were and continue to be managed
by us under a State Department contract in cooperation with the
Colombian government. The State Department contract
provides indemnification to us against third-party liabilities
arising out of the contract, subject to available funding. The
State Department has reimbursed us for all legal expenses to
date. The terms of the contract provide that the State
Department will indemnify our operating company against
third-party liabilities arising out of the contract, subject to
available funding. The State Department has reimbursed us for
all legal expenses to date. 97
From 1991, the State Department contracted the private company
DynCorp to supply services for this air-spraying program, known as Plan
Colombia, against narcotics in the Andean region. In accordance with a 1998
contract, DynCorp also provides the essential logistics to the anti-drug Office
of activities of Colombia, in conformity with three main objectives: eradication
of the cultivation of illicit drugs, training of the army and of personnel of the
country, and dismantling of illicit drug laboratories and illicit drug-trafficking
networks. 98
93
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During its visit to Ecuador, the Working Group received information
from NGOs on the consequences of the spraying carried out under Plan
Colombia on persons living in the frontier region. 99 An NGO report indicated
that one third of the forty-seven women in the study exposed to the spraying
showed cells with some genetic damage, and the study established the
relationship between the air fumigations of Plan Colombia with damage in
their genetic material. 100 Forty-seven women were analyzed, twenty-two in the
frontier line in Ecuador and Colombia. There, the women were exposed to the
glifosato mixture with POEA + Cosmuflux 411 F from the Plan Colombia air
fumigations. 101 All of the women presented genetic damage in a third of the
sanguine cells as well as symptoms of intoxication. 102 The control group of 25
women, more than 80 km away from the fumigated area, presented cells with
scarce genetic damage; most of the cells were in good condition. The study
demonstrates that when the population is subjected to this fumigation the risk
of cellular damage can increase. Once permanent, the cases of cancerous
mutations and important embryonic alterations are increased that prompt,
among other possibilities, the rise in abortions in the area. 103
Self-Determination
The 2004 attempted coup d’état, which was perpetrated in Equatorial
Guinea, is a clear example of the link between the phenomenon of mercenaries
and PMSCs as a means of violating the sovereignty of States. 104 In this
particular case, the mercenaries involved were mostly former directors and
personnel of Executive Outcomes, a PMSC that had become famous for its
operations in Angola and Sierra Leone. 105
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Chairperson of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Human Rights Council,
Report of the Working Group on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Selfdetermination, Addendum, Mission to Ecuador, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/42/Add.2 (Feb. 23,
2007) (by Amada Benavides de Pérez).
100
José Luis Gómez del Prado, The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and
Security Companies (PMSC), CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION (November 8,
2010), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=21826.
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See Tracy McVeigh, Ex-Mercenary Nick du Toit Tells of His Five Years in a “Living
Hell” and Why He is Ashamed of War, THE OBSERVER (June 13, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/13/simon-mann-mercenary-renounces-war.
See
also Press Release, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N.
Experts Visit Equatorial Guinea to Discuss the Menace Posed by the Activities of Mercenaries,
U.N.
Press
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(Aug.
12,
2010),
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at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10273&LangID=E.
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guardian.co.uk
(June
28,
2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/09/equatorialguinea.world.
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The team of mercenaries involved in the coup included two employees
of a PMSC, Meteoric Tactical Systems, who were providing security to
diplomats of western embassies in Baghdad, including the Ambassador of
Switzerland. 106 It also included a security guard who previously worked for
the PMSC Steele Foundation, which also provided protection to President
Aristide of Haiti. 107
A number of the persons involved in the attempted coup in Equatorial
Guinea were arrested in Zimbabwe, others in Equatorial Guinea itself. 108 The
coup was intended to overthrow the government and put another in its place in
order to get the rich oil resources. 109 In 2004 and 2008 the trials took place in
Equatorial Guinea of those arrested in connection with this coup attempt,
including of the British citizen Simon Mann and the South African Nick du
Toit. 110 All foreigners linked to this coup attempt were pardoned in November
2009 by the President of Equatorial Guinea. 111 A number of reports indicated
that trials failed to comply with international human rights standards and that
some of the accused had been subjected to torture and ill-treatment. 112 The
government of Equatorial Guinea has three ongoing trials in the U.K., Spain,
and Lebanon against the persons who were behind the attempted coup. 113
Trafficking in Persons
In 2005, 105 Chileans were providing or undergoing military training
in the former army base of Lepaterique in Honduras. 114 The instruction
consisted of anti-guerrilla tactics, such as possible ambushes and deactivation
of explosives and mortars, and how to avoid them. The Chileans entered as
tourists and were illegally in Honduras, and they used high-caliber weapons
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28, 2004), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11263.
108
McVeigh, supra note 103.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See, e.g. Amnesty International, Equatorial Guinea: Submission to the U.N. Universal
Periodic Review: Sixth Session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council,
November-December 2009, 4, AFR 24/005/2005 (Apr. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR24/002/2009/en/19e4a019-8d7e-49f8-bb1a8c3bf38d3ff6/afr240022009en.pdf; Press Release, Amnesty International, Equatorial Guinea:
Trial of Alleged “Mercenary Coup Plotters” Unfair, AFR 24/010/2005 (June 7, 2005),
available at http://www.amnesty.org.
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José Luis Gómez del Prado, The Privatization of War: Mercenaries, Private Military and
Security Companies (PMSC), CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION (November 8,
2010), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=21826.
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like M-16 rifles and light machine guns. They had been contracted by a
subsidiary of Triple Canopy. 115
They were part of a group that also included 189 Hondurans recruited
and trained in Honduras. Triple Canopy had been awarded a contract by the
U.S. State Department. The strong contingent left the country by air from San
Pedro Sula, Honduras, in several groups with a stopover in Iceland. They then
reached the Middle East, and were smuggled into Iraq. 116
The majority of the Chileans and Hondurans were engaged as security
guards at fixed facilities in Iraq. 117 They had been contracted by Your
Solutions Honduras SRL, a local agent of Your Solutions Incorporated,
registered in Illinois, which in turn had been subcontracted by Triple Canopy,
also based in Illinois. 118
Human Rights Violations Committed by PMSCs Against their Employees
There are also the violations that PMSCs may commit against the
“security guards” they have recruited and employed to operate in low-intensity
armed conflict or post-conflict situations. The personnel of PMSCs are often
the victims of wild capitalism. Within this context, it often appears that
PMSCs, in their search for profit, neglect security and do not provide their
employees with basic rights such as health facilities that are expected in such
situations.
PMSCs often put contracted private guards in situations of danger and
vulnerability, such as the “private contractors” of Blackwater, killed in
Fallujah in 2004 allegedly due to the lack of the necessary safety measures that
Blackwater was supposed to provide in order to carry out the mission. 119
Likewise, there have been discriminatory acts and irregularities in
compliance with the contracts of these employees, who have reported failure to
meet basic health or hygiene needs, overcrowding, harsh working conditions,
failure to pay their wages, abusive treatment by superiors including isolation,
lack of basic necessities such as food and lodging, lack of medical treatment
and poor sanitation, as well as the death of security guards in tragic
circumstances. 120
115
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See Chairperson of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Human Rights
Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination,
Addendum, Mission to Honduras, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/42/Add.1 (Feb. 20, 2007) (by
Amada Benavides de Pérez) [hereinafter Working Group Report, Mission to Honduras].
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B. RECENT INITIATIVES TO REGULATE PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY
COMPANIES
U.S. Congress “Stop Outsourcing Security Act”
The number of private contractors (207,600) utilized by the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) for its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is
more than the uniformed personnel (175,000) in those places. 121 Private
contractors total 54% of the Pentagon’s workforce in these two war zones. 122
The privatization of war and outsourcing of inherent State functions to the
private sector in Iraq and Afghanistan has raised a number of issues for the
U.S. Congress. According to the American Constitution, one of the
fundamental responsibilities of Congress is the question of declaring war,
which has largely been left to the Executive Branch since World War II. 123
With the abolition of the draft, only a small number of Americans are fighting
in U.S. wars. The citizenry has subcontracted the war out to a professional
warrior class. The citizenry and Congress in the U.S. continue to borrow large
amounts of money to wage the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, amounting to
some $3 trillion, which will have to be paid by their children and
grandchildren. 124 In the first 6 months of 2010 more private contractors—hired
guns—(232) have been killed in Afghanistan and Iraq than troops (195). 125
On February 23, 2010, Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) and
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) of the U.S. Congress, introduced legislation in
order to prohibit the use of private security contractors in war zones: The Stop
Outsourcing Security Act. 126 According to the press release issued on that
occasion, in 2009 the U.S. employed over 22,000 hired guns in Iraq and
Afghanistan that protected diplomats, trained military and police officers, and
Council Report of the Working Group on Uhe use of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, Addendum, Mission to Peru, ¶ 68, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.2 (Feb. 4, 2008) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado).
121
See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40764, PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: LEGAL ISSUES (2010).
122
Id. at 11.
123
The power of the executive branch to use force without Congressional approval was
codified through the War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973. While it grants the President
power to unilaterally use military force for sixty days without need of Congressional
authorization, it also requires Congressional authorization to extend the use of force. See War
Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§1541-48 (2006)).
124
See Mark Thompson, More Contractors Than Troops Now Dying in U.S. Wars, TIME,
Sept. 24, 2010, http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2010/09/24/more-contractors-than-troopsnow-dying-in-u-s-wars/#ixzz10YY3IxlS.
125
See T. Christian Miller, This Year, Contractor Deaths Exceed Military Ones in Iraq and
Afghanistan, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/this-yearcontractor-deaths-exceed-military-ones-in-iraq-and-afgh-100923.
126
See Stop Outsourcing Security Act, H.R. 4102, 110th Cong. § 2(1) (2007).
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maintained weapons systems, as well as participated in interrogations and
intelligence gathering. 127 Representative Schakowsky underscored that the
behavior of private contractors had endangered the U.S. military, hurt
relationships with foreign governments, and undermined U.S. missions
overseas. 128
The Stop Outsourcing Security Act would aim at restoring the
responsibility of the American military to train troops and police, guard
convoys, repair weapons, administer military prisons, and perform military
intelligence. 129 The bill would also require that all diplomatic security be
provided by U.S. government personnel and not by PMSCs. 130 Any exception
that The White House might wish to introduce would, under the new Act, be
subject to the scrutiny of the U.S. Congress, which would oversee the
contracts. 131
The legislation would also subject contracts exceeding $5 million to
U.S. Congressional oversight, and agencies with military contractors would
have to report the number of contractors employed, disclose the total cost of
the contracts, and make public any disciplinary actions against employees:
information which is not presently available. 132
Representative Schakowsky and Senator Sanders indicated that the high
salaries offered to contract workers in war zones both burdened U.S. taxpayers
and sapped the morale of the U.S. military. While some soldiers who risk their
lives for their country struggle to support their families, private security
company employees are paid two or three times as much, sometimes pocketing
as much as $1,000 a day. 133
They underscored the way private contractors were perceived by
military officers in the field who reported that those contractors operated like
"cowboys," using unnecessary and excessive force uncharacteristic of enlisted
soldiers. They also referred to some specific incidents provoked by “hired
guns,” such as the Baghdad’s Nissour Square massacre of 2007, in which
security guards working for the PMSC—then known as Blackwater—were
accused of killing 17 Iraqis, damaging the U.S. mission in Iraq and hurting the
U.S. reputation all over the world. Later that same year, they said, a security
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See Press Release, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, Release: Stop Outsourcing Security
(Feb. 23 2010), available at http://sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/news/?id=e37b6ebc-634a4684-a27b-ad03431dc617 [hereinafter Sanders Press Release].
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Dan Kenney, Home Defense: A New Blackwater Course of Special Interest to Christian
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See Sanders Press Release, supra note 126.
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Press Conference, Vermont Senator Bernie Sandards (Feb. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/media/view/?id=21ec8654-7088-4186-ab3fc3cc6937d810.
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contractor employed by DynCorp International allegedly shot and killed an
unarmed taxi driver. 134
The main reasons to enact legislation to phase out the activities of
private military contractors are that: (i) the U.S. Government is increasingly
relying on private security contractors to perform mission-critical and
emergency-essential functions; (ii) these private security contractors operate
outside the military chain of command and have a history of irresponsible and
even criminal behavior, and (iii) high-ranking U.S. military officials have
expressed concern that these private security contractors are hampering the
ability of the U.S. to achieve the government’s goals in Iraq. 135
The Bill would require, inter alia, that:







within 180 days of enactment, all personnel providing security to
U.S. diplomatic and consular missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are
U.S. government employees, effectively banning the use of private
security contractors for diplomatic security;
the President to report to the relevant congressional committees
whether executive agencies will be able to transition away from the
use of private security contractors that perform mission-critical or
emergency-essential functions by January 1, 2011. If the President
reports that it is not possible for a particular agency to make the
transition by January 1, 2011, the Bill requires that the President
report why it is not possible, a target date for the transition, and a
plan for transition by the target date;
the President makes certain certifications regarding private security
contractors that continue to perform mission-critical and
emergency-essential after January 1, 2011;
the relevant congressional committees may review any government
contracts with private security contractors to perform missioncritical and emergency-essential functions that exist after January 1,
2011. It also provides that, with respect to any such contract, the
relevant congressional committees may review the accounting
practices of the private security contractor. In addition it would
provide that an agency agreement with a private security contractor
to perform mission-critical or emergency-essential functions may
only be renewed if the President certifies that the relevant agency
does not have adequate personnel to perform the duties specified in
the contract and that the contractor meets certain specifications;
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Id. Senator Sanders stated that the American people had always prided themselves on the
strength, conduct, and honor of their U.S.States military. He found therefore “very disturbing
that now, in the midst of two wars and a global struggle against terrorism, we are relying more
and more on private security contractors—rather than our own service members—to provide
for our national defense.”
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Stop Outsourcing Security Act, H.R. 4102, 110th Cong. § 2(1)–(9) (2007).
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the relevant congressional committees may access copies and
descriptions of all contracts and task orders, worth $5 million or
more for work to be performed in Iraq and Afghanistan, including
contracts that were entered into between October 2001 and the date
of enactment. The Bill would also provide that, within 60 days of
enactment, the relevant agencies must report to the relevant
congressional committees on the number of individuals working for
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, the total cost of contracts, the
total number of individuals killed or wounded while working on
contracts, and a description of any disciplinary actions that have
been taken against any individuals performing contracts. 136

The report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Inquiry into the
Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan," approved
in October 2010, reveals the threat that security contractors operating without
adequate U.S. government supervision can pose to the mission in
Afghanistan. 137 This report finds serious gaps in fulfilling that responsibility
and concludes that accountability gaps threaten the safety of civilians, U.S.
troops and contractors themselves, as well as gravely undermines U.S. military
missions. 138
The Senate Committee's inquiry found, in part that: (i) there are
significant gaps in US government oversight of private security contractors in
Afghanistan; (ii) the Defense Department has failed to enforce its policies
meant to hold private security contractors' accountable and to address serious
private security contractor deficiencies; and (iii) failures in vetting, training,
and supervising of DOD private security contractors are putting U.S. and
coalition troops as well as Afghan civilians at risk. 139
The U.S. increasingly relies on private contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan to perform a range of services, from filing paperwork to using
deadly force. Private military contractors still outnumber U.S. troops there.
As of May 2010, there were over 23,000 armed private security contractors in
Afghanistan, and as the Committee's inquiry found, operating with inadequate
government oversight. 140
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Rights Council Report of the Working Group on the use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, Addendum, Mission to the
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The Swiss Initiative: the Montreux Document of 2008 and the
International Code of Conduct of 2010
In 2006, in order to address the demand for a clarification of legal
obligations under IHL and IHRL, as regards PMSCs, the Government of
Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross launched what
has been known as the Swiss Initiative, an international process of
consultations with main stakeholders: governments, the new industry of
PMSCs, and civil society. 141 The Swiss Initiative has been supported, in
addition to the Swiss government, by the governments of the U.S. and the U.K.
where most of the industry (70%) and the lobbies of the new security industry
is located: the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) 142 and the
British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC). 143
On September 17, 2008, the process led to a common understanding by
seventeen States 144 known as the Montreux Document on Pertinent
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed
Conflict 145 (the Montreux Document), setting out what the signatories view as
the relevant IHL and IHRL applicable to PMSCs as well as a set of good
practices for them.
It should be noted that this initiative represents only part of the wide
spectrum of countries and their approaches: only seventeen governments
signed the Montreux Document in 2008, and it is presently supported by only
thirty-four States as an instrument negotiated outside the U.N. It is a useful
instrument so far as it identifies existing obligations of States, PMSCs and
their personnel under IHL and IHRL. The description of the good practices
section which is aimed at setting out guidelines could have proved to be a
useful tool for both PMSCs, and State activities. Unfortunately, neither
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The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, SWITZERLAND
FED. DEP’T. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (last modified Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc.
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The founder of the International Peace Operations Association is Doug Brooks, a
specialist in African security issues. He has been an Adjunct Faculty member at American
University and an Academic Fellow and Research Associate with the South African Institute
of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg.
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Andy Bearpark CBE Director General, BRITISH ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE SECURITIES
COMPANIES, http://www.bapsc.org.uk/about_us-andy_bearpark.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2011)
(The Director General of the British Association of Private Security Companies is Andy
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Director of Operations and Infrastructure for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in
Iraq.).
144
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the U.N., Letter dated October 2, 2008
addressed to the Secretary-General of the Security Council, U.N. Soc. A/63/467- S/2008/636
(October 6, 2008) (by Peter Maurer) (Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China,
France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K.,
Ukraine, and the U.S.States of America).
145
Id.

28

29

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

2011

PMSCs nor the main governments outsourcing military and security functions,
in general, have followed these good practices as models. 146
The Montreux Document reiterates the existing IHL and IHRL norms
as well as the principle that States retain their obligations under these areas of
law, even if they choose to contract with PMSCs to perform certain
activities. 147 The State continues to have the duty to respect and ensure human
rights. 148 Within this context, it should be noted that, according to Article 5 of
the Draft Articles on the responsibility of States for internationally unlawful
acts of the U.N. International Law Commission, States are not only responsible
for their organs, but also for acts committed by non-State actors. 149 Respect for
human rights implies refraining from activities that could violate human rights
committed by State organs or agents and private entities attributable to
them. 150 Therefore, the outsourcing of armed forces or police functions may
imply responsibility for the State that delegates such powers: “[w]hatever the
level of individual responsibility, the State will retain responsibility if
violations of international law are committed by private contractors acting in a
public capacity to which power has been delegated.” 151
In addition, in accordance with the due diligence principle, States have
responsibility to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to
prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by acts not only of their
State agents but also those caused by PMSCs or their staff (private persons or
entities) that impair human rights. 152
146

As an example one could mention the government of Canada, one of the 17 signatory
governments of the Montreux document. The Canadian Army outsourced the security of some
of its operations in Afghanistan to at least 4 PMSCs, including Blackwater. In 2008, one
Canadian soldier was shot dead in Afghanistan in a cross fire involving employees of two
private military companies: Compass Integrated Security Solutions and USPI. See Report Into
Death of Canadian Soldier Reveals Mistakes, CBCNEWS (Last Updated Jan. 29, 2009)
(describing the incident and an official report which concludes the soldier was killed by
insurgents). On June 16, 2009, almost a year after Canada had signed the Montreux Document,
neither the Ministry of Defense nor the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would answer questions
about the compliance of the private military and security companies contracted by the
Canadian government in Afghanistan with the good practices contained in the Document. See
(June 16, 2009), http://www.radioUn Silence Qui Derange, RADIO-CANADA.CA
canada.ca/nouvelles/National/2009/06/16/002-Firmes-privees-guerres.shtml.
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The Montreux Document provides a number of good practices, which
take into account concerns expressed by the Working Group. 153 Nevertheless,
while it is a good promotional document on existing IHL, it has failed to
address the regulatory gap in the responsibility that States have with respect to
the conduct of PMSCs and their employees. One of the problems is that the
Montreux Document has not been as broad a consultative process as required
under the U.N. system. For example, States from Latin America and the
Caribbean region did not participate in its work, and the unbalanced
representation of Western States (nine out of the seventeen adopting States)
denotes the heavy involvement of countries from where most of the security
industry originates and operates. Neither U.N. Departments nor the Working
Group took part in the Initiative.
As pointed out by the Working Group, the document places a heavier
burden of responsibility on Territorial States, those States where PMSCs
operate, than on Contracting or Home States, from where these companies
originate or from where they have obtained the contracts. The limited scope of
obligations for Contracting or Home States can be seen throughout the whole
document. Moreover, the restrictive character of the document is illustrated by
the indication that IHL is only applicable during armed conflict, and it fails to
include a reference to the State obligation to protect and to apply the due
diligence principle. 154
The commercial logic of the private military and security industry
appears to be the impetus behind the Swiss Initiative document. For example,
good practice 17 proposes “to consider pricing and duration of a specific
contract as a way to promote relevant IHL and IHRL,” and the Initiative has
therefore de facto recognized the validity of the new industry instead of
proposing a moratorium on such recognition until the good practices which it
has developed are translated into reality and pertinent mechanisms put in place.
The Working Group noted that the industry lobby had played an important role
in the elaboration of the Document and in the Initiative’s process in general. 155
Nothing in the Montreux Document indicates that States should ensure
that existing laws, including criminal laws, are enforced, or that international
153

Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
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standards, such as the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment 156 and requirements that PMSCs and their employees be
held accountable for serious crimes, are upheld. Nor is there any provision in
the document that States should strengthen government standards for
procurement, contracting and management of the private military and security
industry backed by an effective reporting mechanism.
For the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises,
John Ruggie, the worst corporate-related human rights abuses occur amid
armed conflict over the control of territory, resources or a government itself–
where the human rights regime cannot be expected to function as intended and
illicit enterprises flourish. Even reputable companies such as security firms
protecting company installations and personnel may be involved in human
rights abuses. Although businesses increasingly seek guidance from States,
governments are reluctant and poorly equipped to provide such assistance. His
proposed “protect, respect and remedy” framework is supposed to lay the
foundations of a system for better managing business and human rights. It
comprises State duties and corporate responsibilities. It includes preventative
and remedial measures and involves all relevant actors: States, businesses,
affected individuals and communities, civil society, and international
institutions.157
Finally, the approach in the paragraphs on Contracting, Territorial and
Home States excludes the States from where the manpower is recruited by
PMSCs, in most cases without consultations with the respective governments.
It also fails to provide for a centralized system at the State level in Territorial
and Home States which would be responsible for registering all private
military and security industry contracts for applying common standards and for
monitoring contracts. 158
Following the Swiss Initiative, promoted by the Swiss, the U.K. and
U.S. governments, a parallel initiative was launched in June 2009. It created
an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, which
was partially approved during 2010. Supporting this project are industry
associations, in particular the IPOA 159 and the BAPSC, corporations and
individual business leaders, the Swiss, the U.K., and the U.S. governments. As
explained in a circular letter sent by the Head of Political Division IV, Human
156

See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
157
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Human Rights Council, Business
and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect, and
Remedy” Framework, §§ III–V, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie).
158
José Luis Gómez del Prado, Private Military and Security Companies and the UN
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, 13 J. OF CONFLICT & SECURITY L., 429, 429-450
(2008).
159
PMCs Adopt Official Code of Conduct, BLACK FLAG CAFE (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://cafe.comebackalive.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=51995&start=0.
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Rights of the Swiss Directorate of Political Affairs DP, 160 the final goals of this
new initiative are to set high standards for the industry worldwide and to
support the establishment of a voluntary enforcement mechanism to ensure
compliance with such standards.
In contrast with the Montreux Document under the Swiss Initiative, the
International Committee of the Red Cross has only been participating as an
observer, the same as the Working Group, in the process of the International
Code of Conduct. This point is important to emphasize because the way the
International Code of Conduct is presented by the Swiss government gives the
impression that these are not two parallel initiatives, but rather that the Code of
Conduct is the follow-up of the Montreux Document, with the International
Committee of the Red Cross playing the same role and having the same
responsibilities as for the Montreux Document. The regional conferences
organized by the Swiss government to promote both the Montreux Document
and the International Code of Conduct helps to add to this confusion. 161
On November 9, 2010 the first part of the International Code of
Conduct was endorsed in Geneva by fifty-eight PMSCs 162 at a conference
hosted by the Government of Switzerland with the participation of
representatives of industry, governments, clients and other stakeholders. 163
Participants also discussed the second goal of the initiative, namely the
establishment of an independent enforcement mechanism. As of April 1, 2011,
thirty-six additional companies had signed the Code of Conduct totaling nintyfour PMSC. 164

160

For the text of the letter see INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY
PROVIDERS
1
(2010),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede150311audcodeo
fconduct_/sede150311audcodeofconduct_en.pdf.
161
The Swiss government is organizing a series of regional conferences to promote the
Swiss Initiative which includes both the Montreux Document and the International Code of
Conduct as a follow up to the Document. The first of such regional events will take place in
Santiago de Chile on 12-13 May 2011.
162
58 Private Security Companies Sign International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Companies, International Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies (last visited Apr.
14, 2011), available at http://www.icoc-psp.org/.
163
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS, ¶¶ 9–
12 (2010), available at http://www.icoc-psp.org/.
164
See Id.
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Signatory Companies of the International Code of Conduct by U.N.
Geopolitical Regional Groups 165
Western
European &
Others (66)
Belgium (1)
Canada (2)

Africa (17)

Ghana (1)
Kenya (4)

Cyprus (1)
South Africa (9)
Denmark (1)
Sierra Leone (1)
France (3)
Uganda (2)
Germany (1)
Greece (2)
Netherlands (2)
New Zealand (1)
Sweden (1)
Switzerland (2)
United Kingdom
(34)
United States (14)

Asia & the
Pacific (9)
Afghanistan (1)
Iraq (1)

Latin America
(2)
Guatemala (1)
Trinidad and
Tobago (1)

Pakistan (2)
Philippines (1)
Saudi Arabia (1)
UAE (3)

This first step in developing the Code has been the easiest one. The
IPOA and BAPSC, as well as many of the PMSCs, have already elaborated
codes of conduct which make reference to U.N. human rights norms and
international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration. 166 The codes
have been for more than 10 years subject to self-regulation without
implementation or efficacy whatsoever.
The next step in development of the Code of Conduct implies more
difficulties: governments and PMSCs promoting this second phase will have to
agree and find the necessary resources for the functioning of a mechanism
responsible for enforcing the Code as well as to study sanctioning PMSC
employees who may have committed violations to the Code and eventually
compensate the victims. Without the elaboration of this mechanism, which is
to be elaborated within the next 18 months, the whole Swiss Initiative would
be but a campaign of public relations. It is also planned that within 24 months
a conference be convened to revise the International Code of Conduct.

165

Id.
Id. ¶ 21. For example, “Signatory companies will comply, and will require their
Personnel to comply, with applicable law which may include international humanitarian law,
and human rights law as imposed upon them by applicable national law, as well as all other
applicable international and national law.”
166
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In conformity with Article 11, signatory companies and other
stakeholders of the Code “will appoint a multi-stakeholder steering committee
of 6–9 members.” 167 They will function as a temporary board and “will be
responsible for developing and documenting the initial arrangements for the
independent governance and oversight mechanism.” 168 According to
information received by the Working Group, the steering committee has been
established and is composed of three representatives from civil society (Chris
Albin-Lackey, Human Rights Watch; Olver Behn, European Interagency
Security Forum; Devon Chaffee, Human Rights First), four representatives
from PMSCs (Michael Clark, G4S; Mark DeWitt, Triple Canopy; Estelle
Meyer, Saracen International; Sylvia White, Aegis) and two representatives
from governments (Josh Dorosin, U.S. State Department; David Hunt, U.K.
Foreign Commonwealth Office).
Behind this project are the main lobbies of the new industry, such as
IPOA and BAPSC, corporations, and directors of PMSCs who have the active
support of the governments of Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.
This second phase of the Swiss Initiative appears like a “juvenal bath”
presenting a much better image of the product PMSCs are promoting. One
may raise the question as to whether it would not be more appropriate to name
this second phase “operation chameleon.” Not only IPOA has changed its
name, but also a number of companies appear with new names: Blackwater is
Xe, Sandline is Aegis. Even the Code of Conduct is “for Private Security
Providers.” Any reference to the “Montreaux Document On Pertinent
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to
Operations of Private Military and Security During Armed Conflicts” has been
abandoned–notwithstanding that in Article 1 of the Preamble of the Code there
is an important reference to the essential role PMSCs play in “military
activity.”
The companies take the responsibility to respect the human rights of,
and fulfill humanitarian responsibilities towards, all those affected by their
business practices, including personnel, clients, suppliers, shareholders, and the
population of the area in which services are provided. They also recognize the
importance of respecting the local cultures they encounter in their work,
including respect for those individuals with whom they come into contact as a
result of their activities.
The purpose of the Code of Conduct is to create a baseline for the
development of enforceable standards and to lay a foundation for effective
enforcement of those standards. The Code commits signatory companies to
abide by high standards that promote good practices as well as to monitor and
assess the potential adverse human rights impacts of their activities and
establish effective corporate governance frameworks, including reporting and
monitoring, for preventing such adverse impacts.
167
168

Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
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It must be pointed out that behind this operation, as a number of articles
of the Code (3, 4.c) emphasize, one of the main purposes of the Code is to
“protect the interests of their clients.” And as underlined in Article 14 “The
Code itself creates no legal obligations and no legal liabilities on the Signatory
Companies.”
The fact that among the 94 PMSC signatories of the Code one can find
companies such as Blackwater, 169 United Resources Group, G4S and its
affiliate ArmorGroup or Triple Canopy, all involved in grave human rights all
violations; companies such as DynCorp, Blackwater, and Aegis, all with a
troubled past; Executive Director of Triple Canopy who boasts that the code of
his company has served as a model for the Code; the Swiss Department of
Political Affairs, one of the main movers of the Code, was aware that in 2004
the Swiss Ambassador in Baghdad was protected by employees of Meteoric
Tactical Solutions, involved in the attempted coup d’Etat in Equatorial Guinea;
and the Ugandan company Saracen Uganda Ltd. allegedly involved in training
paramilitaries in Puntland, Somalia, is also a signatory of the Code are not
signs to inspire much confidence. However, one will have to wait for the
Steering Committee to complete its work in the next 18 months to find out
whether or not these signs are confirmed.
A relevant question taht could be posed to the promoters of such a
Code is: why they opened to signature a code for which oversight mechanisms,
such as: (i) certification; (ii) auditing and monitoring; (iii) reporting have yet to
be developed. Would it not have been more logical to have developed the
oversight mechanisms first before opening the Code for signature? PMSCs
accepting the Code of Conduct should have had in front of them a package of
obligations before signing it, which has not been the case.
The self-regulatory and voluntary mechanisms established by the
International Code of Conduct have been welcomed by the Working Group as
a useful but insufficient mechanism to regulate and monitor the activities of
PMSCs. 170 The Working Group agrees with the Swiss government that these
are parallel and complementary mechanisms and firmly believes that selfregulatory measures should be integrated in legally binding instruments at the
national, regional and international level. The Working Group also sees
favorably and as a certain guarantee that representatives from Human Rights
Watch and Human Rights First are members of the Steering Committee. It
hopes that they will assure that the oversight mechanisms provide the
maximum of guarantees.
169

Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, Blackwater Founder Said to Back Mercenaries, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 2011, at A4 (Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater presently operating from
Dubai, would be behind operations against Somali pirates carried out by the PMSC Saracen).
170
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/14 (Jan. 21, 2009)
(by Alexander Nikitin).
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However, one has to point out the insufficiency of such voluntary
mechanisms, even those with oversight procedures. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has elaborated Guidelines
which establish voluntary principles for the activities of multinational
enterprises. They represent standards of behavior for multinational enterprises.
Adhering countries have a National Contact Point whose role is to promote and
ensure the effective implementation of the OECD Guidelines, including
providing good offices for the handling of specific instances.
In June 2005, the Australian National Contact Point (ANCP) for the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises received a submission from
several Australian and overseas non-governmental organizations (“the
complainants”) alleging that a U.K.-controlled multinational, Global Solutions
Limited, in providing immigration detention services to the Australian
Government through its Australian incorporated subsidiary GSL (Australia)
Pty Ltd (GSL Australia), had breached the Human Rights and Consumer
Interests provisions of the Guidelines. 171 Among the allegations was the
detention of children in violations of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the indefinite and arbitrary detention of asylum seekers in contravention
of Article 9 of the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Article 9 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. GSL
Australia and the complainants engaged in a constructive manner to resolving
many of the issues. However, six years after the submission no substantive
action has been taken. 172
For the time being, the International Code of Conduct is rather a
document of “good intentions” since the oversight mechanisms to control such
“good intentions” by the security industry are not yet in place. The security
industry has two years to do so. Two years is exactly the time which has been
allocated to the open-ended intergovernmental working group created by the
HRC to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory

171

Human Rights Council of Australia et al vs Global Solutions, OECD WATCH (last visited
Apr. 14, 2011), http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_73.
172
The mandatory detention of asylum seekers in Australia and their human rights violations
in detention centers run by private security companies is dealt with in the report of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Commission
on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Arbitraty Detention, Addendum, Visit to
Australia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.2, (Oct. 24, 2002). The objective of the visit was to
inquire about the application of international human rights standards to asylum-seekers
detained in several Immigration Detention Centers in Australia. The following are some of the
matters of concern to the U.N. Working Group: (1) Detention of vulnerable persons especially
unaccompanied young children, elderly persons, pregnant women, handicapped persons…(2)
A collective depression syndrome due to the legal framework for detention with acts of selfdestruction such as corporal lacerations by jumping onto the razor wire, lips sewn, suicide
attempts…(3)The practice of collective or individual isolation; (4) Gross inadequacy of
guarantees for lawyers and the judiciary; (5) Charges levied on detainees; (6) Delays in
releasing detainees; (7) Ramification of the privatization of the centers on the legal status of
detention.

36

37

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

2011

framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of
private military and security companies. 173 What a coincidence!
The Council of Europe and the European Union
Concerned by the widespread outsourcing of inherently governmental
functions to the private sector and the impact of PMSCs in eroding the State
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe requested, in 2008, its Political Affairs Committee to carry
out a study and make concrete proposals on this matter. The Report of the
Political Affairs Committee, Private Military and Security Firms and the
Erosion of the State Monopoly on the Use of Force, was submitted by its
Rapporteur, Mr. Wolfgang Wodarg, Germany, Socialist Group, to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on December 22, 2008.174
On the basis of the report, the Parliamentary Assembly recommended to the
Committee of Ministers to elaborate on a Council of Europe instrument aimed
at regulating the relations of its Member States with PMSCs. The Assembly
indicated the minimum standards that the instrument should contain with
regard to the activities of PMSCs. The Assembly also indicated its preference
for a legally binding document.
The Assembly suggested that such an instrument should contain a
minimum of elements with regard to the monopoly of the legal use of force
and the functions and activities perform by PMSCs. In its approach, the
instrument should:





define those areas of internal and external security that must remain
a sovereign function of the state and that are ‘inherently
governmental’ in character;
standardize the principles for the safeguard of the state monopoly
on the use of force;
contain a clear affirmation of the dividing line between internal and
external security as established by law and the constitution;
contain a clear indication prioritizing conflict prevention over rapid
reaction as well as handling conflicts by civilian approaches instead
of using force to solve conflicts.

173

See Human Rights Council Res., 15/26, Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group
to Consider
the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation,
Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies, 15th
Sess., Oct. 7, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/26.
174
Report of Political Affairs Committee, Private Military and Security Firms and the
Erosion of the State Monopoly on the Use of Force, Parl. Eur. Doc. 11787 (Dec. 22, 2008) (by
Wolfgang Wodarg).
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With regard to the functioning of PMSCs, the instrument should:

















specify and define the principles for the use of PMSCs;
determine the criteria regarding the activities, obligations, duties,
responsibilities, including accountability for breaches of
international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, and the
areas of tasks and competences of PMSCs;
define the criteria that must be applied to admission of PMSCs for
carrying out military and security services;
contain provisions for the establishment of a registration and
licensing system for PMSCs;
adjust and harmonize national and international criminal law
(especially rules of law enforcement) regarding criminal acts
committed by PMSCs and their personnel;
introduce specific rules for PMSCs in civil law (especially as
regards conditions of liability);
set up a legal and regulatory framework for PMSCs who wish to
export their services (e.g. mission and project-oriented
authorizations which provide democratic oversight, control,
supervision, accountability and specification of responsibilities; it
would be advisable to combine such regulations with the existing
arms export regimes);
require parliamentary approval for missions of PMSCs outside
their national territory, and provisions establishing co-operation,
information sharing and assistance between the States involved;
contain provisions for the application of laws and rules governing
deployment of national military and police forces abroad to
PMSCs as well;
contain rules and regulations (e.g. code of conduct and
requirement to register with the foreign ministry) for business
companies, non-governmental or humanitarian organizations etc.
who wish to contract PMSCs for their security purposes abroad;
contain provisions obligating the PMSC sector to set up a
framework for self-control, including a binding code of conduct
and the establishment of a (PMSC-Ombudsman) and/or a (PMSC
violations investigation team);
contain regulations regarding: (i) an effective vetting and training
system for PMSC personnel; (ii) effective oversight and
investigatory system; (iii) an effective enforcement system, and
(iv) the protection of social rights of PMSC employees.
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In 2009, the above-mentioned report was reviewed by the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 175 of the Parliamentary Assembly, which
in its recommendations warmly welcomed the report of the Political Affairs
Committee. It made several amendments to support and further strengthen the
critical approach adopted by the Political Affairs Committee and aiming at
clarifying and completing some provisions of the draft recommendation from a
legal point of view.
It stressed the risk of impunity raised in the recommendation pointing
out that PMSC personnel have committed serious human rights violations, and
the complicated contractual and diplomatic relations involved (between the
staff member and the PMSC, between the PMSC and its home State, often via
intermediaries, and between the home State and the State of deployment) make
it very difficult, if not impossible, to bring perpetrators to justice. It indicated
that any contractual clauses excluding liability are null and void, as they are in
contracts to that similarly disadvantage third parties (the victims of any
violations). The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights intended to
address the issue of impunity of PMSC personnel in its report on impunity in
Europe in the framework of the periodic debate on the state of human rights in
Europe.
Within this context it should also be mentioned that the European
Commission has financed the Project PRIV-WAR. This is a collaborative,
three-year research project financed by the European Community which was
launched in January 2008. It has been coordinated by the European University
Institute through the Academy of European Law in Florence and LUISS
“Guido Carli” in Rome. 176 The project has assessed the impact of the
increasing use of private military companies and security companies
(PMCs/PSCs) in situations of armed conflict. It has analyzed the international
responsibility and accountability of corporations. It has also examined the
regulatory framework at national, European and international levels, with a
view to ensuring improved compliance with international humanitarian law
and human rights.
A major objective of the project has been to explore ways in which the
EU could regulate or facilitate the regulation of PMCs/PSCs with a view to
assure compliance with IHRL and IHL. The results of this three year project
as well as the PRIV-WAR recommendations to the European Commission
concerning possible options for the European Union Regulatory Action will be
presented at the end of April 2011. 177
175

Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Private Military and
Security Firms and the Erosion of the State Monopoly on the Use of Force, § 1, Parl. Eur. Doc.
11801 (Jan. 27, 2009) (by Kimmo Sasi).
176
The other universities involved in the project are: Justus Liebig Universität Giessen; Riga
Graduate School of Law; Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), Centre Thucydide; University
of Sheffield and Utrecht University. See About the Project, PRIV-WAR (last visited Apr. 14,
2011), http://priv-war.eu.
177
Id.
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United Nations System (Departments, Programs and Agencies)
One of the major consequences that the terrorist attacks carried out in
Western countries at the beginning of the 21st Century and the occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq have had in activities of the U.N. agencies as well as
other providers in relief and development operations has been an increased
demand for security. The agencies of the U.N. system have been confronted
with the problem that their small unit of security were unable and unprepared
to assure the security for the deployment in the field of humanitarian relief and
development operations, particularly that such operations need to be deployed
fast and with urgency in extremely insecure environments such as Iraq,
Afghanistan and Somalia and other unstable states.
The pressure for security in the respective U.N. agencies comes both
from substantive humanitarian relief and development programs inside the
organizations and from the security industry itself. Indeed, PMSCs have and
continue to exert pressure to bear in order to expand their role into the
humanitarian sphere. Counting humanitarian agencies as clients has multiple
advantages for such companies as enhancing their reputation, providing
distance from the mercenary label, and gaining a foothold in a potentially
lucrative market. 178
The increasing size and spread of international humanitarian operations
has contributed to greater numbers of major violent incidents against
humanitarian personnel, 179 which has in turn prompted humanitarian
organizations on occasion to outsource their security needs. Despite a number
of years of acknowledged usage of PMSCs, a lack of transparency on the issue
persists among humanitarian actors—and in many cases even within individual
agencies. Headquarters in many U.N. agencies tend to take a hands-off
approach in this area, allowing country-level managers to decide what is
needed and feasible for their particular context. Local offices, operating in a
policy vacuum, thus make these important decisions with little or no guidance
from their headquarters (indeed sometimes even without their knowledge), and
do not generally practice close oversight and monitoring of the PMSCs
activities. 180 In 2007 the Center on International Cooperation and the
Humanitarian Policy Group established a joint research team in collaboration
with the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in order to
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Spearin, Christopher, Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations and International
Private Security Companies: The “Humanitarian” Challenges of Moulding a Marketplace 8-9
(Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Policy Paper No. 16, 2005),
available at http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/documentos/382_FileContent.pdf.
179
STODDARD, ABBY, ADELE HARMER, AND KATHERINE HAVER, PROVIDING AID IN
INSECURE ENVIRONMENTS: TRENDS IN POLICY AND OPERATIONS 20 (2006).
180
Cockayne, James (2006) Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post-Conflict
Settings: An Exploratory Study, New York: International Peace Academy.
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carry out a study on the use of private security companies in humanitarian
operations. The study was financed by the Government of Canada. 181
The main purpose of the research study was to shed light on a
widespread but under-examined practice, and to feed into a process to establish
norms and standards of usage to guide humanitarian actors. It identified the
main areas of concern and/or potential increased risk, in particular the: (1) ad
hoc screening of PMSCs, and the lack of systematic referencing of individual
companies between humanitarian actors; (2) lack or scarce monitoring by
agencies of the contracted PMSCs activities, which could potentially
compromise the agency’s principles, ethics, or behavioral standards, or, in the
worst case scenarios, violate international legal norms; (3) lack of exclusivity
in agreements, meaning that the PMSCs could have additional clients, such as
belligerent parties, that may reflect poorly on the humanitarian actor’s clients;
and (4) little or no reference to international standards in hiring practices and
scopes of work.
As has been pointed out by one expert hiring security services locally may
very well compromise neutrality by feeding into conflict dynamics. It may
also create new sources of conflict and insecurity by degenerating into
protection rackets or sparking localized arms races. Conversely, use of
international PMSCs can compromise acceptance by introducing a foreign
element, and distancing the agency from the beneficiaries and host community.
Increased isolation from these actors has the dual effect of increasing
programming challenges and distancing the agency from one vital source of
information that might otherwise enhance its security. Additionally, as one
agency visibly increases deterrent measures there is a possibility that other aid
actors will switch to utilizing external security measures—creating a domino
effect—to ensure they are not perceived as soft targets in contexts where
militant movements view aid operations as opportune objects for violence. 182
In the course of the last two years, the U.N. Security Management
System (UNSMS) has been working with the view to coordinating policies and
procedures regarding the outsourcing of security to the private sector for the
entire U.N. system. The U.N. Security Management System is the body
responsible to coordinate, through its security focal points in each of the U.N.
departments, agencies and programs, the security regarding matters affecting
staff, premises and operations all over the world. The UNSMS has a full body
181

See Human Rights and Protection of Civilians 2007-08, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
CANADA
(last
modified
March
10,
2011),
http://www.international.gc.ca/glynberry/civilians-protection-civiles_0708.aspx.
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COCKAYNE, JAMES, COMMERCIAL SECURITY IN HUMANITARIAN AND POST-CONFLICT
SETTINGS:
AN
EXPLORATORY
STUDY,
(2006),
available
at
http://www.securitymanagementinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_deta
ils&gid=21&lang=en; See also Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries, U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of
Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶¶ 5, 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 5, 2010) (by José Luis
Gómez del Prado).
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comprising representatives of all the departments, agencies and programs. It
meets twice a year and has a Steering Committee to advise it. The Steering
Committee also meets twice a year prior to the meetings of the UNSMS. In
October 2010 a PSM working group was set up consisting of the heads of
security of ten U.N. departments, agencies and programs in order to elaborate
recommendations for the whole U.N. system. 183 The proposals elaborated by
this PSC body in a meeting held in Panama in December 2010 were considered
by the UNSMS at its January 2011 meeting. Thirty U.N. departments,
agencies and programs 184 agreed on the use of PSC as a measure of last resort
as well as on a set of basic recommendations which will be submitted in early
2011 to the U.N. Policy Committee and the Secretary-General in order to issue
the appropriate directives for the whole U.N. system.
The basic
recommendations may include elements such as: (1) the use by the U.N. of
armed PSCs should be a measure of last resort to meet its obligations and only
when no other options are available such as the protection by the host state, by
other member states or using internal U.N. resources. 185 All U.N. agencies that
have been using PDCs for a long time would need to legitimize or develop a
policy. This should be done in accordance with existing approval security
processes, not through the procurement but through the U.N. Security
Management System; (2) The use of PSCs would be strictly for protecting
people, premises and convoys, no for information gathering, intelligence or
other functions; (3) U.N. departments, agencies and programs that may need to
use PSC will have to choose from a list of companies that meet agreed criteria;
(4) the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights would keep the
relevant U.N.departments fully briefed on the activities of the Working Group
as well as on the open ended intergovernmental working group established by
the Human Rights Council to consider the possibility of a regulatory
framework for PMSCs. 186
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These are: UNDPKO, UNDP, UNOCHA, UNHCR, UNOHCHR, UNICEF, WHO, FAO,
WFP and WIPO.
184
Two U.N. agencies did not agree on using PSC in any circumstances.
185
In Afghanistan and Somalia, for instance, security has been outsourced. In Iraq, partly of
the security is provided by the host state, partly by a member state present in the country and
partly by internal U.N. resources.
186
Information provided to the Working Group during its 12th Session held at Geneva from
April 4–8 2011. Report of the Working Group to the U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/18/ (forthcoming).
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C.
THE PROPOSED CONVENTION BY THE U.N. WORKING GROUP
REGULATE AND MONITOR PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY

2011

TO

The U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries
Both the Commission on Human Rights and the HRC decided to
reinforce the mandate on mercenarism and related activities by transforming it
into a Working Group composed of five independent experts, taking into
consideration the geopolitical dimensions of the U.N. 187
The Working Group has not received, however, the support of Western
governments. One of the main reasons given is that the question of
mercenaries is too closely linked to the period of decolonization and the
situation of peoples under foreign occupation. It was during this period of
decolonization that the U.N. General Assembly adopted a report from its Sixth
Committee, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the U.N. Charter. 188
The view of Western delegations is that the Sixth Committee of the
U.N. General Assembly which deals with interrelations of the different
branches of international law, such as international criminal law, IHL, State
responsibilities, the question of mercenaries and PMSCs should be considered
by that Committee and not by the HRC or the Third Committee of the General
Assembly. 189
One among many other arguments invoked by States in favor of
discussing mercenary-related matters in these U.N. forums is precisely that the
right to self-determination is a fundamental human right encompassing civil,
political as well as economic, social and cultural rights; that Article 1 common
to the two international covenants on human rights contains the right of the
peoples to self-determination and that that article is closely related to the right
to development. In addition, recent events have shown the implications of the
activities of PMSCs in the enjoyment of human rights.
In 2009, the HRC specifically requested the Working Group to:
(a) Consult with intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations, academic institutions and experts on the content and
scope of a possible draft convention on private companies offering
military assistance, consultancy and other military security-related
services on the international market . . .

187

G.A. Res. 2005/2, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/2 (Apr. 7, 2005).
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 121
(Oct. 24, 1970).
189
See infra the statements delivered by the representatives of the European Union, Norway
and the U.K. to the U.N.Human Rights Council in one of the next sections of this article.
188
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(b) Share with Member States, . . . , elements for a possible draft
convention on private military and security companies, requesting their
input on the content and scope of such a convention . . . ;
(c) Report to the fifteenth session of the Human Rights Council on the
progress achieved in the elaboration of the draft legal instrument for
proper consideration and action; 190
In order to fulfill this mandate, the Working Group has conducted a series of
consultations with governments of the five geopolitical regions of the world on
issues relating to the impact of the activities of PMSCs on the enjoyment of
human rights, as well as regulating and monitoring the activities of PMSCs. 191
It has also organized a series of consultations with a wide range of
stakeholders on the content and scope of a possible draft Convention. In this
context, an initial draft text of the Convention was circulated on July 15, 2009
to some 250 experts, academics and NGOs to provide their input on the
contents and scope of the Convention. The Working Group received some 45
written submissions, comprising a total of over 400 comments.
On the basis of the comments received from the above-mentioned
stakeholders and the feedback on the ideas contained in the draft elements
during the regional consultations held in the five regions of the world, the
Working Group drafted a new text which was shared with Member States. 192
The draft text of an international instrument, as well as the
recommendation of the Working Group to the U.N. to create an open-ended
working group entrusted with the elaboration of a convention, were submitted
to the HRC at Geneva in September, 2010 and to the General Assembly’s
Third Committee in November 2010.
The argument that to employ PMSCs is more cost-effective may be true
in the short term and provided that a number of socio-economic variables are
not taken into consideration, such as the training in the use of weapons and
counterinsurgency operations of former militaries and policemen, paid by the
190

Human Rights Council Res. 10/11, The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, 10th
Sess., ¶ 13 (March 26, 2009).
191
José L. Gómez del Prado, Why Private Military and Security Companies Should be
Regulated, 4 Business and Human Rights Resource Center (Sep. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Gomez-del-Prado-article-on-regulation-of-private-andmilitary-firms-3-Sep-2010.pdf. (The first consultation for Latin America and the Caribbean
was held in Panama in 2007, the second in Moscow for Eastern Europe and Central Asia in
2008. The Working Group held, thereafter, regional consultations in Bangkok in 2009 for Asia
and the Pacific, in Addis Ababa for Africa in 2010, and in Geneva for the Western European
and Others Group also in 2010.)
192
Id. The Working Group received written submissions from Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Canada, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Lebanon, Qatar, Russian Federation, Serbia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain (on behalf of the European Union), Switzerland, Trinidad and
Tobago, the U.K. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the U.S.States of America as well
as written submissions from the institutions of the Commonwealth of Independent StatesStates
(CIS)).
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taxpayers and not by PMSCs themselves. In this connection it is worth noting
the increasing number of militaries who are attracted by the higher salaries are
leaving the army in developed and developing countries to join PMSCs.
A way to decrease costs for PMSCs has been to contract more and
more former militaries and policemen from developing countries at much
lower salaries. Issues of reintegration and post-traumatic stress disorder in
individuals returning to their communities from military/security work abroad
have not been assessed either. Because of the nature of their contracts
thousands and thousands of these “guns for hire” are disposable and available
in the market and ready to be employed in any conflict situation.
In fact, the attractive salaries offered by PMSCs are attracting soldiers
from national armies, which are suffering a hemorrhage of personnel leaving to
join PMSCs. This phenomenon is affecting both developed and developing
countries. In order to fight this trend, the government of Canada had to
increase the salaries of its most experienced and professional military
personnel. 193 The Chief of the Defense Ministry informed the Working Group
during its mission to Chile that, in an attempt to discourage the recruitment of
military personnel, many of whom retire before the age of 45 and saw the
opportunities proposed by PMSCs to work in conflict or post-conflict areas as
incentives to remain active and supplement their pensions, efforts were under
way to consider lengthening the military career and offering servicemen better
rewards by providing them sufficient pensions to ensure a decent retirement. 194
Why a new international instrument is necessary
In the course of its research the Working Group has found out that there
is a regulatory legal vacuum covering the activities of PMSCs and a lack of
common standards for the registration, and licensing of these companies as
well as for the vetting and training of their staff and the safekeeping of
weapons. While a number of rules of IHL and IHRL could apply to States in
their relations with PMSCs, the Working Group has observed that there have
been challenges to the application of domestic laws in particular for
193

DAVID ANTONYSHYN, JAN GROFE & DON HUBERT, PRIV-WAR REPORT–CANADA,
BEYOND THE LAW? THE REGULATION OF CANADIAN PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY
COMPANIES OPERATING ABROAD 10 (2009) (Men with military backgrounds trade in their
uniforms to become guns for hire. They are paid as much as US$1000 a day by private
companies, governments, intergovernmental organizations, ngos or humanitarian organizations
to act as bodyguards for VIPs or dignitaries and guard facilities. In 2005, the Canadian Forces
increased financial benefits for members of the special forces known as JTF 2. The maximum
allowances, in addition to a member‘s regular pay, amount to over $27,000 per year for the
most experLHQFHGʊVSHFLDORSHUDWLRQVDVVDXOWHUV 
194
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, Addendum, Mission to Chile, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.4 (Feb. 4, 2008)
(by José Luís Gómez del Prado).
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international PMSCs operating in a foreign State as well as difficulties in
conducting investigations in conflict zones. 195 The effect of this situation is
that PMSCs are rarely held accountable for violations of human rights. The
accountability of private military and security contractors continues to be a
challenge, with a startling lack of prosecutions. Such legal gaps need to be
addressed at the national, regional, and international levels. 196
Another argument in favor of an international instrument relates to the
very nature of the PMSC industry and the impact of the activities of these
companies on the enjoyment of human rights. The services provided by
PMSCs should not be considered as ordinary commercial commodities that can
be controlleded through self-regulation initiatives. The functions filled by
PMSCs are highly specific and dangerous and involve the trade of a wide
variety of military and security services requiring the elaboration of
international standards and monitoring mechanisms.
For instance, as was pointed out to the HRC by the representative of the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, 197 there have been a number
of cases in Afghanistan of collusion of international and security companies in
government corruption and illegal businesses. Such activities included
creating insecurity with the objective of securing their business and expanding
contracts by providing anti-government groups with bribes to ensure the
movement of military and humanitarian convoys, as well as providing havens
for suspects or alleged perpetrators of human rights violations and crimes
against humanity and recruitment facilities of security companies.
Within this context, the Working Group has received information
indicating that PMSCs support warlords and rebel groups in some instances:
For instance, allegations suggest that in Afghanistan a
number of PMSCs contracted by the Government of the
U.S. have a privileged relationship with the Taliban. Others
suggest that a German PMSC was considering deploying a
significant number of military guards to Somalia to train
warlord groups close to the self-proclaimed but not
internationally recognized President of Somalia, Abdinur
Ahmed Darman. 198
195

Particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in Colombia.
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 5, 2010) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado)
(proposing a draft Convention, for consideration and action by the HRC).
197
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Human Rights
Council Report of the Working Group on Uhe use of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, Addendum, Mission to Afghanistan,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25/Add.2 (June 14, 2010).
198
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
196
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The current instability in many countries such as Somalia, where
PMSCs operate, on the one hand, and the absence of measures to monitor their
activities at the international level, on the other, makes their regulation
everyday more necessary. The situation in Somalia, is a prototype of such
situations:
[While] southern Somalia remains a patchwork of fiefdoms
controlled by rival armed groups—a political and security
vacuum in which no side is strong enough to impose its will
on the others—the relatively stable northern regions of
Puntland and Somaliland have suffered increasing spillover
from the conflict to the south in the form of targeted killings
and bombing. 199
As indicated by the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, of this country’s
economy depends on the increasing activity of PMSCs in the fight against
piracy, the support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the
Transitional Federal Government, and protection for private enterprises. Most
PMSCs and their employees are unaware of the U.N. sanctions and may
therefore be operating in violation of the arms embargo. 200
Nonetheless, the U.N. resolutions which establish control and
monitoring measures for international, regional and sub-regional organizations
providing supplies or technical assistance remain silent about PMSCs. 201
The use of private military and security contractors carries a number of
risks both in times of peace as well as during armed conflicts because they can
operate as secret armies without any accountability; they are not obliged to
obey any military orders or follow the military code of conduct. Rather, their
only obligation is to the contract they signed and to comply with IHL on war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity which apply to all persons in
war.
The fact that PMSC personnel are not usually “mercenaries” is also a
strong argument for the adoption of a new instrument. Indeed, the definition of
“mercenaries” under the two international conventions dealing with this issue
does not generally apply to the personnel of PMSCs legally operating in

Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 5, 2010) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado);
See also Somali Warlord Hires German Mercenaries to Provide Security Services, SPIEGEL
ONLINE (May 25, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,696580,00.html.
199
Letter dated 10 March 2010 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee
Pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia and Eritrea Addressed
to the President of the Security Council, summary, U.N. Doc. S/2010/91 (Mar. 10, 2010).
200
Id. ¶¶ 219–20.
201
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1916, U.N. Doc. SC/RES/1916 (Mar. 19, 2010).
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foreign countries. 202 Since there exists already an international convention on
mercenaries it is necessary to illustrate this point. In the first place one should
distinguish between jus in bello, the right in war, (IHL) which provides norms
to be respected during conflicts but which does not ban or prohibits war and
jus ad bellum, the right to war.
Article 47 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions which defines a
mercenary in the participation of international armed conflicts does not
prohibit them and the only sanction it imposes is that a mercenary is not
entitled to the prisoner of war status. 203 A mercenary, however, is entitled to
the fundamental guarantees under the Geneva Conventions. The definition of
Article 47 that provides the elements which must be fulfilled in order to label a
person a mercenary has been copied literally into the 1989 International
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries. 204
According to the definition under the Convention, to be considered a
mercenary the person has to fulfill the five conditions set out in that
instrument: (a) been recruited to combat in an armed conflict; (b) is motivated
by the desire for private gain; (c) is neither a national of a party to the conflict
nor a resident; (d) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the
conflict; (e) has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on
official duty as a member of its armed forces. 205
Each of these elements taken individually poses problems. For
example: the person has had to be recruited to combat, i.e. to take part in direct
hostilities. This has to be specified in the contract, which usually is not. In
addition, the person may or not be taking part in direct participation in
hostilities, which is not always the case. The question of proving that the
person is only motivated by the desire of gain is extremely hard to prove. As
to the question that in order to be a mercenary the person must not be a
national or a resident of a party to the conflict excludes a large number of
persons. For instance, under this criteria all the citizens of countries
participating in the Iraq war (Americans, British, Dutch, etc.) would not be
catalogued as mercenaries.
In addition, one has to bear in mind that the five elements of the
definition are cumulative, and all of them must be fulfilled: not only one or a
few. Moreover, other problems which had not been envisaged at the time have
appeared now with the contracting out of military and security functions to the
202

See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict art. 47(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter AP I]; International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries art. 1, December 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 75 [hereinafter Mercenaries
Convention] (setting out the definition of mercenaries). See also José Luis Gómez del Prado,
The Privatization of War, CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=21826.
203
AP I, supra note 201.
204
Mercenaries Convention, supra note 201.
205
Id.
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private sectors. For instance, the definition is ambiguous or does not foresee
the activities of PMSCs in armed conflicts. It does not make the distinction
between active and passive participation in combat. It leaves out the training
of militaries, the operational assistance to the armed forces and the strategic
planning. It does not envisage how to regulate services to combatants
(medical, water and electricity supply, engineering activities, or maintenance).
Finally it does not deal with the protection of premises and of persons. These
last two issues are dealt with in IHL but only for international conflicts.
Nevertheless, PMSCs are present in all types of situations and not only in
international conflicts.
One should also bear in mind that a number of soldiers and policemen
contemplate PMSCs as a way to continue making lots of money after their
retirement. In fact, the majority of these companies have been created or are
managed by former militaries or ex-policemen for whom this is big
business. 206
The aim of such a binding legal instrument is not the outright banning
of PMSCs, but rather to establish minimum international standards for States
parties to regulate the activities of PMSCs and their personnel. However,
taking into account that there are no common standards at the national level,
Member States may wish to take the elements contained in the new
international instrument as an opportunity to strengthen or establish
mechanisms for the companies operating strictly at the domestic level.
In addition, taking into account the extensive outsourcing of military
and security functions and the growing role of PMSCs in armed conflicts, postconflict and low intensity armed conflict situations it is also recommended to
prohibit the outsourcing of inherently State functions to PMSCs in accordance
with the principle of the State monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 207

206

For example, MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporation) was created by four
former generals of the U.S. Army when they retired, among which General Carl E. Vuono,
Chief of the Army during the Gulf War and the invasion of Panama; General Crosbie E. Saint,
former Commander in Chief of the USA Army in Europe and General Ron Griffith. The
President of MPRI is General Bantant J. Craddock. The same is true for Blackwater and its
affiliate companies or subsidiaries which employ former directors of the C.I.A. such as Cofer
Black, former Chief of the Counter Terrorism Center; Enrique Prado, former Chief of
Operations and Rof Richter, second in command of the Social Scientists refer to this
phenomenon as the Rotating Door Syndrome. Clandestine Services of the Company. See
Background, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (last updated May 20, 2004),
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&ddlC=39; Amy Farnsworth, Romney
BOSTON.COM
(Sept.
13,
2007),
Names
Terrorism
Policy
Advisors,
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2007/09/romney_names_te.html.
207
According to Martin L. Van Creveld, there has been a “revolution in military affaires”
(RMA) in which nation-StatesStates are being replaced by “war-making entities.” MARTIN L.
VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR (1991). Such trend has been on the rise for a
number of years, but the magnitude of its dimension has taken dramatic and worrisome
dimensions with the involvement of private military and security contractors in the wars of
Afghanistan and Iraq.
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In the proposed text of a U.N. Convention on PMSCs, the Working
Group defines inherent State functions as those:
functions, which are consistent with the principle of the State
monopoly on the legitimate use of force and that a State cannot
outsource or delegate to PMSCs under any circumstances.
Among such functions are direct participation in hostilities,
waging war and/or combat operations, taking prisoners, lawmaking, espionage, intelligence, knowledge transfer with
military, security and policing application, use of and other
activities related to weapons of mass destruction and police
powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention including
the interrogation of detainees and other functions that a State
Party considers as inherently State functions. 208
In this regard, the Working Group is concerned by the trend of
outsourcing by the U.S. Government which two of its members observed
during their mission in the U.S. in 2009. Indeed, the DOD authorizes its
contractor personnel, when such functions are specified in the contract, to
“conduct or support intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, or tactical
questioning.” 209 In 2010, following the human rights abuses by contractors in
Abu Ghraib, the U.S. Congress recommended, in the National Defense
Authorization Act 210 for Fiscal Year 2010, to ban the use of contractors in the
208

See HRC Resolution 15/22, Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group to Consider
the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation,
Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies, 15th
Sess., Sept. 13-Oct. 1, 2010, art. 2, 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/26 (Oct. 1, 2010).
[hereinafter Annex II]. See also reference in previous paragraphs to Article 5 of the Draft
Articles on the responsibility of States which stipulates that States are not only responsible for
their organs, but also for acts committed by non-state actors. I NT’L L. C OMM’N, DRAFT
ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, art. 5
(2001),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
209
See Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Human
Rights Council Report of the Working Group on the use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, Addendum, Mission to the
United States of America, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25/Add.3 (June 15, 2010) (by Shaista
Shameem).
210
The Act eventually reflected a compromise. It provides that, “no enemy prisoner of war
. . . or any other individual who is in the custody or under the effective control of the
Department of Defense . . . may be interrogated by contractor personnel." However, contractor
personnel with proper training and security clearances may be used as linguists, interpreters,
report writers and information technology technicians in interrogations provided that (a) they
are covered by the same rules governing detainee interrogations as government personnel
performing the same interrogation functions and (b) that Department of Defense personnel will
oversee the contractor’s performance. The prohibition may be waived if such a move is vital to
the national security interests of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §1038, 123 Stat. 2190 (2010).
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interrogation of detainees. Despite that recommendation, the U.S. President
rejected this limitation, allowing that "in some limited cases, a contracted
interrogator may possess the best combination of skills to obtain critical
intelligence." 211
The proposed new instrument would reaffirm the responsibilities of
States regarding the activities of PMSCs. 212 States are responsible for
implementing their obligations under IHRL, including by adopting such
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to give effect to these
obligations. To this end they have the obligation to take appropriate measures
to prevent, investigate, punish and provide effective remedies for misconduct
by PMSCs and their personnel. These legal responsibilities of States, which
remain even if States choose to contract out certain activities, have been
emphasized by the U.N. Human Rights Committee. The Committee stated that
“the contracting out to the private commercial sector of core State activities
which involve the use of force and the detention of persons does not absolve a
State party of its obligations under the Covenant.” 213
“Finally, the proposed new binding legal instrument” is aimed at
ensuring “that States take the necessary measures to promote transparency,
responsibility and accountability in their use of PMSCs and their personnel, as
well as establish mechanisms for the rehabilitation of victims.” 214
Within the U.N., the HRC constitutes the best forum to address these
challenges and elaborate a new international instrument aiming at the
regulation, oversight and monitoring of PMSCs. Indeed, the HRC is the only
forum in which civil society, academics, non-governmental organizations and
human rights national institutions can interact with States on given issues
through several procedures which have been established by the Council, such
as open-ended working groups.
Debate at the U.N. Human Rights Council
The report of the Working Group containing the draft text of the
proposed Convention to regulate and monitor PMSCs was discussed during the

211

Mission to the U.S, supra note 107, ¶ 19.
See infra Annex I articles 1, 4, 5, 8-11, Rep. of the Working Group on the use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of
Peoples to Self-Determination, transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly
pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/2 on the use of mercenaries as a
means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to selfdetermination, art. 1, 4, 5, 8-11, U.N. Doc. A/63/325 (Aug. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Working
Group Report Pursuant to Resolution 2005/2].
213
Human Rights Comm., Cabal v. Austl., Comm. No. 1020/2001, para. 7.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001 (2003).
214
Working Group Report Pursuant to Resolution 2005/2 supra note 110, art. 12-19, 28.
212
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15th Session of the HRC, held at Geneva from 13 September to 1 October
2010. 215
Over twenty-five State delegations participated in the debate. A
number of non-governmental organizations also took the floor including
Advocates for Human Rights and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission. Pakistan (on behalf of Organization of the Islamic Conference),
Syria (on behalf of the Arab Group), Nigeria (on behalf of the African Group),
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba,
Ecuador, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sudan and
Venezuela expressed support for additional measures to regulate and monitor
the activities of PMSCs at the national and international level as well as for the
recommendation of the Working Group to establish an open-ended
intergovernmental working group to elaborate a Convention on the basis of the
text and the elements presented by the Working Group. In addition, many of
these delegations also supported:
the holding of a high-level round table of States, under the
auspices of the United Nations, to discuss the fundamental
question of the role of the State as holder of the monopoly of
the use of force, with the objective of facilitating a critical
understanding of the responsibilities of the different actors,
including private military and security companies, in the current
context, and their respective obligations for the protection and
promotion of human rights and in reaching a common
understanding as to which additional regulations and controls
are needed at the international level. 216
The E.U., U.K., and U.S. supported neither the draft Convention
proposed by the Working Group nor the recommendation to establish an open
ended intergovernmental working group.
The main arguments put forward by Belgium, on behalf of the E.U.
were that, while acknowledging the importance that the PMSC industry should
be properly regulated, it did not consider this issue as a primarily matter for
the HRC. The issue of regulating PMSCs interrelates with several branches of
international law such as the law of the use of force, IHL, international
215

Office of the High Comissioner for Human Rights, “It’s high time to close the legal gap
for private military and security contractors”–UN expert body on mercenaries,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10000&LangID=E.
See also Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N.
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means
of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 5, 2010) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado);
See also Draft Convention infra Annex I.
216
General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Promotion And Protection of all Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.7 (March 19, 2008).
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criminal law and State responsibility law. Any consideration of elaborating an
international regulatory framework of PMSCs should examine the existing
international regulatory frameworks and should take into account all not just
U.N. international and regional initiatives, such as the Montreux Document
and other initiatives such as the one launched by the European Community and
the Council of Europe
For the U.K., PMSCs were not primarily a human rights issue and fell
outside the competence of the HRC. The U.K. also disputed the competence
of the Working Group to deal with this subject. The Montreux Document had
reiterated existing international law with regard to State obligations to regulate
PMSCs. Therefore, no new added value would be obtained from a new
international instrument regulating States obligations.
The U.K. promoted high standards of the PMSC industry in order to
reduce the risks that the activities of PMSCs might give rise to IHRL or IHL
concerns or have a negative impact on international security and stability. It
had carefully considered regulation of PMSCs and concluded that the
regulatory structure suggested in the draft convention by the Working Group
would be impossible for States to enforce and would not be effective. The
promotion of high standards would be best achieved through a combination of
robust regulation in the U.K. through a trade association based on a Voluntary
Code of Conduct agreed with and monitored by the government using its
position as a big buyer of PMSC services to promote compliance with that
Code and seeking an International Code for the industry consistent with the
U.K. Code which would cover all aspects of PMSC organization and operation
worldwide.
The U.S. took very seriously issues regarding private security
companies, military contractors and their accountability. It agreed that private
security providers should be accountable for their actions and that challenges
did remain but they were best addressed by a strengthened implementation and
oversight and best practices by the industry and not through a new human
rights instrument. In addition, the draft Convention proposed by the Working
Group was not an appropriate foundation for negotiations between States. It
would address all matters regarding security guards anywhere and would also
ban private contractors to provide knowledge transfer with military, security or
police application. This would likely prohibit certain training and education
activities and have an impact on the training and professionalization of national
militaries and law enforcement agencies and U.N. peacekeeping efforts.
The U.S. was supportive of the Initiative promoted by the Swiss
government to draft an International Code of Conduct for PMSCs. Such Code
of Conduct when completed would set out best practices for private security
service providers even where enforcement of the law was a challenge and
should be given a chance to mature before further action was taken.
Unfortunately, the resolution ill-advisedly prioritized consideration of a legally
binding instrument when additional laws were what was most needed at this
point. The U.S. was disappointed that their and other delegations’ suggestions
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to adequately address these concerns were not fully reflected in the final
resolution.
The U.S. acknowledged the importance of the issues regarding PMSCs,
but the Convention would not produce an effective resolution of those issues
and would divert valuable time efforts and resources from a more practical
approach. Furthermore, the well-intentioned resolution would risk creating
new issues that have not been adequately appreciated and considered.
Switzerland, in explaining its abstention welcomed the possibility of a
new binding instrument on the regulation and monitoring of PMSCs. Such an
instrument would need to be adopted on the basis of a large consensus among
States. It regretted that the resolution had been adopted by a vote and not by
consensus. Switzerland was in favor of better regulation of PMSCs and their
use in armed conflict. The Swiss Initiative was complementary to the
elaboration by the Working Group of a new draft convention and the Code of
Conduct could be seen as a useful transition tool before the establishment of a
binding legal framework was in place. It was the understanding of Switzerland
that the open ended intergovernmental working group to be established by the
resolution would include in their debates the frameworks established by the
Swiss Initiative.
Norway, in explaining its abstention, underscroed the growing trend of
using PMSCs to assume various security and military assignments as
concerning in particular because the use of such companies for combat-related
activities implied a risk of blurring the distinction drawn in IHL between
combatants and non-combatants: thus undermining the protection of civilians
as well as the security of both soldiers and humanitarian workers. There was a
strong need for clearer and more restrictive regulations of State use of PMSCs
for such assignments. However, Norway believed that the development of a
new legal instrument in the area of IHL lied outside the mandate of the HRC.
Her Majesty’s representative forgot to refer to the case of Danny
Fitzsimons, a former British soldier who had been:
diagnosed as suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) in January 2004, while still in the army. Assessments
by consultant psychiatrists in May 2008 and June 2009 reported
that the symptoms had worsened. Despite this, in August 2009,
he was hired by ArmorGroup and sent out to Iraq without
undergoing a full medical assessment. Within 36 hours of his
arrival, the incident took place in which…he killed two
colleagues and injured an Iraqi. 217
ArmorGroup is a British transnational private security company
operating in 27 countries and a founder and full member of the two main
217

Paul Gerrard, Betrayed-Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Casualties of War, THE
SOCIALIST (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/issue/610/8775.
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lobbies of the security industry: the IPOA and BAPSC. These two lobbies
together with the governments of the U.K., the U.S., and the Swiss government
have been the prime movers behind the Montreux Document. Despite these
facts and that IPOA and BASPSC have codes of conduct for the private guards
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, no vetting procedures
were applied in the case of Danny Fritzsimons as is the general practice with
PMSCs. 218 The legally binding Convention would aim at preventing such cases
by requesting governments to regulate the industry and assume their
responsibilities.
A number of contradictions were also contained in the arguments put
forward by the delegations of the E.U., Norway, the U.K. and the U.S. On the
one hand, they affirmed that the issues surrounding PMSCs were not solely a
within the realm of human rights and disputed the competence of the HRC and
its Working Group to deal with this matter. On the other hand, they fully
supported the Swiss Initiative and the International Code of Conduct, the
primary aim of which is the promotion and respect of human rights by the
managers and employees of PMSCs.219
It should also be pointed out that if the Working Group was not
competent to deal with such matters it is difficult to understand why the
governments of the U.K. 220 and the U.S. 221 invited the Working Group to visit
their respective countries and entered into a fruitful dialogue with the two
independent experts of the Group who visited the U.K. and U.S. regarding
218

Terri Judd and Tom Peck, Security Industry to Review Vetting after Report on Murder
Suspect, THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 15, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/security-industry-to-review-vetting-after-report-on-murder-suspect-1772618.html.
219
In this connection, the final version of the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers dated 9 November 2010, sates that the PSC endorsing this Code
commit to the following principles, as set forth in this Code: (c) to operate in a manner that
recognizes and supports the rule of law; respect the human rights, and protect the interests of
their clients; (d) to take steps to establish and maintain an effective internal governance
framework in order to deter, monitor, report, and effectively address adverse impacts on
human rights; (e) to provide a means for responding to and resolving allegations of activity
that violates any applicable national or international law or this Code, (…). With regard to the
human rights to be respected as a matter of priority, the Code of Conduct specifically
addresses: Arbitrary Detention; Prohibition of Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; Sexual or Gender Based Violence; Human Trafficking; Prohibition
of Slavery and Forced Labour; Rights of the Children, namely Prohibition on the worst forms
of Child Labour; Discrimination; Respect for Privacy and Property; Freedom of Expression
and Peaceful Assembly; Freedom of Association.
220
Rep. of the Working Group on the use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: Rep. of the
Mission of the Working Group to the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. (26-30 May 2008), Human
Rights Council, 10th Sess., Mar. 2- 27, 2009, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/14/Add.2 (Feb. 19,
2009).
221
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, Addendum, Mission to the United States of America, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/15/25/Add.3 (June 15, 2010) (by Shaista Shameem).
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matters such as the lack of accountability, oversight of PMSCs, and human
rights violations committed by PMSCs.
One would be tempted to think from the statements of Western
delegations that some governments are of the opinion that when a State does
something wrong it is a human rights concern, but when the private sector does
it, it is just business as usual. 222
South Africa is not a Member of the HRC and therefore could not vote.
It had been behind the scene as the main mover in the negotiations of the
resolution and held informal consultations with all delegations in order to
accommodate to the maximum extent the concerns expressed by Western
States in a revised text of the resolution. South Africa emphasized the point
that the mandate of the open ended intergovernmental Working Group would
be to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory
framework. Nothing could be a substitute for a transparent and all-inclusive
intergovernmental process. The intergovernmental Working Group would be a
forum for all to receive input such as the Montreux Document and other
suggestions 223 as well as a dialogue to find solutions. Additionally, South
African representative stated that the HRC should be the home and the
platform for those needed it most and
where democracy was destroyed by the machinations of some
private military security companies, whose actions in Africa had
left behind destruction and suffering. This was a globalised
world, where borders were collapsing. The Council must keep
pace with these developments and make sure that those
responsible anywhere would be held accountable, and victims
would have recourse. 224
222

D. Isenberg, Sloppy Language and Human Rights, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/sloppy-language-and-human_b_751992.html.
“What I find interesting about the comments from countries like Belgium, USA, Norway, and
UK was that they do not consider the issue of private military and security contractors a human
rights issue. Yes, of course, some shade their response by saying (Belgium) it is not ‘primarily’
a human rights issue or (U.S.) that other existing laws are more appropriate for considering the
issue. But, at least with respect to private security, if not private military, contractors, where
the salient issue is ensuring that people with guns don't do things they should not do, they are,
as a definitional issue, no different from regular military forces . . . So judging from the state's
objections listed above one might be forgiven for concluding that at least some countries think
that when a state does something wrong it is a human rights concern. But when the private
sector does it, it is, perhaps, just business as usual? I can't help but think of George Orwell's
famed 1946 essay, ‘Politics and the English Language’ which focused on the link between
sloppy language and sloppy thinking.”
223
See e.g. Report of the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe on the ‘Private Military and Security Firms and the Erosion of the State
Monopoly
on
the
use
of
Force.’
(Dec.
22,
2008),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc08/EDOC11787.pdf.
224
Press Release, United Nations Office at Geneva Human Rights Council Establishes
Working Group on Activities of Private Security Companies, Renews Mandate on Sudan and
Somalia, Statement of Jerry Matthews Matjila, South Africa (Oct. 1, 2010),
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South Africa called on the HRC to send a strong signal to those private
companies making profits by committing human rights violations and
overthrowing governments that their actions would not be tolerated anymore.
Nigeria introduced the draft resolution with a series of amendments
negotiated 30 minutes before the vote took place, taking into account all
concerns expressed in order to accommodate them with the view of adopting
the text of the resolution by the largest possible consensus. The mandate of the
open-ended intergovernmental Working Group would be to consider and
discuss the possibility of developing a legally binding instrument among other
options, to serve as a regulatory framework at the international level. As in
other intergovernmental processes, the main aim of the motion tabled was to
enter into a discussion with all stakeholders as to how to address the problem.
For that it was necessary to explore all the issues and then to move forward to
negotiate. The fears expressed by a number of delegations were not founded;
the resolution aimed at ensuring accountability of PMSCs operating
extraterritorially.
Despite all the efforts deployed by the delegation of South Africa and
the sponsors recognized both by Belgium, on behalf of the E.U. and Norway,
the resolution was put to a vote by the U.S. The HRC adopted by 32 votes in
favor, 12 against with 3 abstentions for the draft resolution presented by
Nigeria on behalf of the African Group. 225 The draft resolution had been
negotiated by the delegation of South Africa that had organized a number of
informal consultations in order to include the concerns of Western delegations
and adopt the text by consensus. Their concerns had been included as much as
possible in the revised draft.
The following delegations voted against the draft resolution: Belgium,
France, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Rep. of Korea, Rep. of Moldova, Slovakia,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/970F00950D5C0681C1257
7AF005CFEB4?OpenDocument
225
See infra Annex II. The text of the draft resolution was negotiated and changes made to
accommodate the concerns of the Western countries right up to 30 minutes before the voting
started. Cuba, Russia and Venezuela co-sponsored the new text, along with the African Group
even after changes. China was awaiting instructions from the capital and could not confirm cosponsorship. Brazil, which had submitted language very much along the text adopted could not
get instructions from the capital because of the upcoming presidential elections. It is interesting
to underscore that during the debate of the report of the Working Group, the representative of
South Africa informed the U.N.Human Rights Council that South Africa had repatriated the
corpses of 40 South African citizens killed in Iraq who had been employed as private security
guards. As it has been pointed out in previous paragraphs of this article, some 2,000 private
contractors have been killed in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to 2010 and over 10,000 have
been injured. The figures regarding the killing are most probably higher due to the fact that
many cases may have not been indicated to the U.S. Department of Labor by families in
developing countries or by the fact that in a number of cases the companies do not declare their
employees in order to make more profits. South Africa has been the first and only State to
report that its citizens employed by PMSC have been killed, though as indicated many other
countries have also been affected.
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Spain, Ukraine, U.K. and U.S. 226 Three Members abstained: Maldives,
Norway and Switzerland. The remaining 32 Members of the HRC voted in
favor: Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Chile, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala,
Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand, Uganda,
Uruguay and Zambia. 227
The title of the resolution, as adopted, 228 reads now: “Open-ended
intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an
international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight
of PMSCs.” The words “on the elaboration of a legally binding instrument,” as
well as “of the impact of the activities and on the enjoyment of human rights”
have been deleted.
Operative paragraph 4 of the resolution was also changed to take into
account Western States concerns and reads now:
for the purpose of transparency and inclusivity to establish an
open-ended intergovernmental working group with the
mandate to consider the possibility of elaborating an
international regulatory framework, including inter alia, the
option of elaborating a legally binding instrument on the
regulation, monitoring and oversight of the impact of the
activities of private military and security companies including
their accountability, taking into consideration the principles,
main elements and the draft text for a possible convention
proposed by the Working Group as a means of violating
human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples
to self-determination. 229

226

The United Nations geopolitical distribution in five blocks has not changed since the
inception of the Organization and does not correspond to the real world in the twenty-first
century. This is reflected in the voting pattern in different U.N. bodies and organs. For
instance, Japan and the Republic of Korea, which belong to the Asia and Pacific Group, vote
generally as Western European and other States do. Former Eastern European States, such as
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, which now form part of the European Union, vote as Western
European and Other States. Countries such as Moldavia and Ukraine, which are not part of the
European Union, but which aspire to be integrated in it, usually vote as Western European and
Other States.
227
The Council also adopted, by 32 votes in favor, 12 against with 3 abstentions, a
resolution extending the mandate of the Working Group for three additional years. The
resolution was introduced by the representative of Cuba. See infra Annex II.
228
Id.
229
See infra Annex II (emphasis added).
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Finally, operative paragraph 6, reads now: “Further decides
that the open-ended intergovernmental working group shall present
its recommendations at its twenty-first session.” 230
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main aims of the proposed international convention elaborated by
the Working Group are to address a number of concerns shared by the
international community, such as the lack of transparency, accountability and,
in some cases immunity and impunity PMSCs and their employees enjoy.
These issues are undermining the mere foundations of democratic institutions
all over the world.
In this context, it should be recalled that for the sake of security for all
members of society, citizens, at least in Western democracies, have implicitly
agreed not to use force individually but to give the legitimate monopoly of the
use of force to the State. We are now witnessing that what we, as citizens,
have granted to the State as an inherently function to guarantee security for all
as a public good is being privatized and contracted out by the State: only those
able to afford it will be enjoying security. The proposed convention underlines
the need to share information on companies in an open and transparent way, in
order to provide greater public and parliamentary scrutiny.
The text also emphasizes the responsibility of PMSCs, not merely
through self-regulatory processes but as responsible entities of society linked
to the principle that States are always responsible for protecting, respecting and
remedying human rights violations even if they have chosen to contract out
certain activities with PMSCs. In addition, it opens the avenue to the
responsibility of intergovernmental organizations such as the U.N. or NATO,
which in the spur of the anarchical globalization of the economy are
increasingly outsourcing security functions to the private sector.
For the last two decades Cuba has been at the forefront of the HRC on
the issue of mercenaries and the activities of private companies offering
military assistance, consultancy, and other military security-related services on
the international market. And it has been the main sponsor of the resolutions
adopted on mercenaries in the U.N.
The position of the Western Group has been a rejection of the Cuban
motions by voting against the establishment, mandate, and recommendations
of the Working Group. 231 Member States of the Western Group, and
principally the U.K. and U.S., where approximately 70% of the PMSCs are
located, have discredited the resolutions presented by Cuba on the basis that
these private contractors are not mercenaries but employees of commercial
230

Id.
For a brief account of some of the same conclusions I draw in this section see also Amol
Mehra, A Pyrric Victory at the United Nations over the 21st Century’s “Privateer Industry ?”
RIGHTRESPECT, Oct. 14, 210, http://www.rightrespect.com/2010/10/14/a-pyrric-victory-at-theunited-nations-over-the-21st-centurys-%C2%A8privateer-industry%E2%80%9D/.
231
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entities legally registered fulfilling contracts outsourced by governments,
mainly of the U.S., multinational companies, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations providing such activities as training, intelligence
and passive security. In addition, they claim that the HRC is not the
appropriate forum since the matter of PMSCs is not primarily a human rights
issue.
However, since 2001 the use of these private contractors to support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the human rights violations in which
they have been involved has been the focus of international attention. It has
generated debate about the type of functions PMSCs should fulfill, the norms
under which they should operate and how to monitor their activities.
To respond partly to these concerns, the U.K. and the U.S., with the
government of Switzerland, the IPOA—for the U.S.—BAPSC—for the
U.K.—launched the Swiss Initiative which led in 2008 to the adoption of the
Montreux Document. It reiterates the norms of IHL and IHRL and sets out a
series of good practices to be followed on a voluntary basis by PMSCs.
However, these excellent examples cannot be left to self-regulation if they are
meant for something else than window dressing: an enforcing mechanism is
necessary. Left to self-regulation by the security industry, the good practices
contained in the Montreux Document appear more as a public relations
operation because PMSCs continue to fail to apply them. 232
Because of their impact in the enjoyment of human rights, the Working
Group was convinced that a legally binding instrument regulating and
monitoring their activities at the national and international level was necessary.
Its 2010 reports to the HRC and the General Assembly recommend the U.N.
take action on this issue.
For the first time, a different resolution dissociating the activities of
PMSCs from the traditional resolution on mercenaries was tabled this year at
the HRC in Geneva. The main mover of this resolution has been South Africa,
a country that has been compelled to repatriate the corpses of 40 South African
private guards contracted by PMSCs operating in Iraq. The original text of the
resolution requesting the establishment of an intergovernmental open-ended
working group with the mandate to elaborate a legally binding instrument on
the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the impact of the activities of
PMSCs on the enjoyment of human rights, changed substantially and was

232

For example, PMSCs committed human rights violations in the Iraqi prison of Abou
Ghraib, summary executions at Nissour Square in Baghdad, and continue to lack vetting
procedures in cases such as that of former soldier Danny Fitzsimons, who had been diagnosed
as suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in January 2004, May 2008 and June
2009. Fitzsimons was hired by ArmorGroup, sent out to Iraq without undergoing a full
medical assessment and 36 hours after his arrival killed two colleagues and injured an Iraqi
may suffice to demonstrate that the activities of these guns for hire must be regulated and
monitored. See Paul Gerrard, Betrayed-Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Casualties of War,
THE SOCIALIST (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/issue/610/8775.
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weakened by the introduction of amendments in order to accommodate
concerns of Western countries.
Although adopted by a large number of favourable votes (32-12-3), 233
the negative vote of the delegations of the Western Group is a clear indication
that the interests of the new expanding security industry—its annual market
revenue is estimated to be over $100 Billion—have been quite well-defended,
as has been the case in a number of other occasions. Relatedly, it is worth
mentioning that the regional consultation for Western States scheduled to be
hosted by the government of Spain in Madrid, in October 2010, had to be
cancelled due to the lack of interest showed by Western governments in
participating.
However, the resolution adopted by the HRC opens a process for all
stakeholders to elaborate an international framework to regulate and monitor
the activities of PMSCs. The elements and the draft text of a possible
Convention presented by the Working Group will be one among many other
initiatives for the elaboration of such international regulatory framework. The
“good practices” and the norms of IHL and IHRL reiterated and contained in
the Montreux Document should also be considered as well as the initiatives of
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Indeed, the Council of
Europe has been seized by two expert reports indicating the need to adopt a
legally binding instrument regarding PMSCs. 234 That proposed instrument
contains recommendations which have not been addressed by the Working
Group such as the prioritization of conflict prevention to rapid reaction and
handling conflicts by civilian approaches instead of using force to solve
conflicts.
Since the U.N. Working Group was established in 2005 in general and
more particularly since the HRC decided in October 2010 to establish an open
ended intergovernmental working group to consider a regulatory framework
for PMSCs, one important development has occurred in the Council’s
Advisory Committee. Indeed, the progress report 235 on the right of peoples to
peace, prepared by the drafting group of the Advisory Committee on this issue,
233

It is important to mention that four members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China and South
Africa with the exception of India) are behind this resolution. BRICS is the group of emerging
economies accounting for more than a quarter of the world’s land and more than 40% of world
population. They form a strong geopolitical alliance in the United Nations. See Konstantin
Rozhnov, Bric Countries Try to Shift Global Balance of Power, BBC NEWS (April 15, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8620178.stm. This in addition to the vote of Pakistan on behalf of
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Syria on behalf of the Arab Group and Nigeria on
behalf of the African Group.
234
Political Affairs Comm., Private Military and Security Firms and the Erosion of the State
Monopoly
on
the
Use
of
Force,
Doc.
No.
11787
(2008),
http://assembly.coe.int/images/IcoDocExistPDF.gif; Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, Private Military and Security Firms and the Erosion of the State Monopoly on the Use
of Force: Opinion, Doc. No. 11801 (2009),
235
Progress Rep. on the Right of Peoples to Peace, Human Rights Council, 6th Sess., Jan.
17-21, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/AC/6/CRP.3 (Dec. 22, 2010). This document was discussed
and adopted at the Advisory Committee’s session held in January 2011.
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devotes a whole section to PMSCs and proposes the following standards for a
future declaration on the right to peace:
(a) States should refrain from outsourcing inherently state
military and security functions to private contractors. They
should establish an international regime with clear rules
regarding the oversight and monitoring of existing private
military and security agencies; and (b) States shall ensure that
PMSCs, their personnel and any structures related to their
activities perform their respective functions under officially
enacted laws consistent with international human rights and
humanitarian law. They shall take such legislative,
administrative and other measures as may be necessary to
ensure that PMSCs and their personnel are held accountable
for violations of applicable national or international law. 236
The rapidity with which the Swiss Initiative has moved since the establishment
of the Working Group by the U.N. in 2005, first to elaborate the Montreux
Document which reiterates the norms in IHL and proposes good practices that
PMSCs should follow, and secondly in elaborating an International Code of
Conduct with oversight mechanisms must be considered a very positive
development indeed. The Working Group hopes that the oversight mechanism
will be finalized and enter into force as soon as possible. Such self-regulatory
mechanism is necessary but will never replace the State obligations which
should be regulated by a binding international instrument.
Another major development has been the discussions which have taken
place in the U.N. system regarding the outsourcing of security to the private
sector. In several of its reports to the HRC and the General Assembly, the
Working Group, having observed the lack of coordination and the absence of a
policy and procedures regarding the use of PMSCS by the U.N., has
recommended that U.N. departments, offices, organizations, programs and
funds establish an effective selection and vetting system and guidelines
containing relevant criteria aimed at regulating and monitoring the activities of
PMSCs working under their respective authorities. In doing so they should
ensure that the guidelines comply with human rights standards and IHL. 237

236

Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 5, 2010) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado).
237
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7 (Jan. 9, 2008) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado)
[hereinafter Jan. 9 Working Group Report]; Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Report
of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and
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The Working Group welcomes the activities that have been carried out in the
U.N. system aiming at agreeing upon a common policy and procedures
regarding the use of PMSCs.
The launching by the European Commission of the three year project
PRIV-WAR in 2008, of which the primary objective has been to propose to the
countries of the E.U. a common regulatory framework for PMSCs, is regarded
as a very positive initiative. This has been one of the major recommendations
of the Working Group to intergovernmental organizations such as the E.U. 238
The Working Group hopes that the European Commission will take action on
the recommendations emanating from the PRIV-WAR Project.
The unwillingness of Western States to join this process of elaborating
an international regulatory framework for such important problems as the
privatization of war indicates that Western governments are not willing to have
a binding instrument which would monitor the activities of PMSC. Without a
large consensus and, in particular, the participation of the U.K. and U.S., the
main exporters of these activities, as well as other Western countries where the
new industry is growing fast the resolution passed in the HRC appears more
like a pyrrhic victory since the process which opens with the creation of the
open ended working group appears extremely difficult if not impossible.
However, if we do not want to return to the times of imperialistic companies
such as the Bay Hudson or the East India Company which dominated immense
territories in Canada and India and which obliged the King of England to fight
unnecessary wars ; or, even worse, to go back to the Middle Ages and see
multinationals take the place of feudal lords; public opinion and civil society in
Western countries must react and exert enough pressure to bear on their
respective governments for this process to succeed.

impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, ¶ 60, (2010) transmitted by
Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/325 (Aug. 25, 2010).
238
Rep. of the Working Group on the use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, transmitted
by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly pursuant to the Commission on Human
Rights resolution 2005/2 on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, U.N. Doc. A/63/325 (Aug.
25, 2010); Jan. 9 Working Group Report, supra note 231; Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries, Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating
human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, (2007)
transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/62/301 (Aug. 24, 2007);
Chairperson of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a means of violating human
rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, Human Rights
Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled
“Human Rights Council”, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/42/Add.2 (Feb. 7, 2007) (by Amada Benavides
de Pérez).
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ANNEX I: ELEMETS OF THE PROPOSED DRAFT CONVENTION
The main elements of the draft convention proposed to the international
community are analyzed in the following paragraphs. 239
Preamble
The preamble makes reference inter alia to:
 The General Principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations:
the erga omnes obligations related to the protection of human rights,
the principles of sovereign equality of all States, the territorial integrity
and political independence of every State, the right of peoples to selfdetermination, and the prohibition of the threat and use of force in
international relations;
 The principles and rules of international human rights and humanitarian
law and their complementarity;
 The principles contained in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes;
 The duty of all States to prevent abuses of international human rights
and humanitarian law or other abuses committed by or involving
transnational corporations and other business enterprises;
 The duty of all States to prevent human rights violations through
legislative and other measures, the duty to investigate reports of
violations and, where appropriate, prosecute and punish offenders as
well as to provide adequate remedies to the victims;
 The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials;
the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms
by Law Enforcement Officials; the United Nations Non-Binding
Guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian
Convoys; the Montreux Document of 17 September 2008 on pertinent
international legal obligations and good practices for States related to
operations of private military and security companies during armed
conflict; the U.N. Global Compact initiative for businesses;
 The increasing outsourcing of inherently State functions which
undermine any State’s capacity to retain its monopoly on the legitimate
use of force;

The increasing and alarming cases of abuses of international human
rights law and international humanitarian law committed by PMSCs
and their personnel, and aware of the pressing need to establish
239

Rep. of the Working Group on the use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, Annex, Gen.
Assembly on its 65th Sess., Sept. 15, 2010-Oct. 2011, Annex, U.N. Doc., A/65/325 (Aug. 25,
2010).
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effective measures to ensure that PMSCs activities are carried out in
accordance with international law;
The fact that self-regulation of private military and security companies
is insufficient to ensure the observance of international human rights
law and international humanitarian law by the personnel of these
companies;
The urgency for State Parties to agree on international minimum legal
standards to regulate and monitor the activities of PMSCs.

.
Purposes of the Convention:
The purposes of the Convention are to:
 Reaffirm and strengthen the State responsibility for the use of force
within the comprehensive framework of State obligation to respect,
protect and fulfill human rights, and to provide remedies for victims of
human rights violations;
 Identify those functions which are inherently State functions and which
cannot be outsourced under any circumstances;
 Regulate the activities of PMSCs and sub-contractors;
 Promote international cooperation between States regarding licensing
and regulation of the activities of PMSCs in order to more effectively
address any challenges to the full implementation of their human rights
obligations including the right of peoples to self-determination;
 Establish and implement mechanisms to monitor the activities of
PMSCs and violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law, in particular any illegal or arbitrary use of force committed by
PMSCs, prosecute the violators and provide remedies to the victims.
(Art. 1)

Definitions:
The convention proposes a number of definitions, including the following:
 Private Military and/or Security Company (PMSC): a corporate
entity which provides on a compensatory basis military and/or security
services by physical persons and/or legal entities.
 Military services: specialized services related to military actions
including strategic planning, intelligence, investigation, land, sea or air
reconnaissance, flight operations of any type, manned or unmanned,
satellite surveillance, any kind of knowledge transfer with military
applications, material and technical support to armed forces and other
related activities.
 Security services: armed guarding or protection of buildings,
installations, property and people, any kind of knowledge transfer with
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security and policing applications, elaboration and implementation of
informational security measures and other related activities.
Export of military and/or security services: an export of military
and/or security services from the home State in which a PMSC is
registered or export of military and/or security services which a PMSC
provides outside the State in which it is registered or where it has its
principle place of management or headquarters.
Import of military and/or security services: an import of military
and/or security services which a PMSC registered in a foreign State
provides.
Inherently State functions: functions, which are consistent with the
principle of the State monopoly on the legitimate use of force and that a
State cannot outsource or delegate to PMSCs under any circumstances.
Among such functions are direct participation in hostilities, waging war
and/or combat operations, taking prisoners, law-making, espionage,
intelligence, knowledge transfer with military, security and policing
application, use of and other activities related to weapons of mass
destruction and police powers, especially the powers of arrest or
detention including the interrogation of detainees and other functions
that a State Party considers as inherently State functions.
Contracting States: States that directly contract with PMSCs for their
services, including, as appropriate, where such a company subcontracts
with another PMSC or where a PMSC operates through its subsidiary
companies.
States of operations: States on whose territory PMSCs operate.
Home States: States of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC is
registered or incorporated; if the State where the PMSC is incorporated
is not the one where it has its principal place of management, the State
where the company has its principal place of management or
headquarters is the home State.
Third States: States other than the contracting, home States or States
of Operations whose nationals are employed to work for a PMSC.
(Art.2)

Scope of application:




The Convention applies to States and inter-governmental organizations
within the limits of their competence with respect to PMSCs, their
activities and personnel.
References to "States Parties" in the Convention shall apply to intergovernmental organizations within the limits of their competence.
The Convention applies to all situations whether or not the situation is
qualified as an armed conflict. (Art.3)
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General Principles:
The Convention is based on the following principles:


State responsibility vis-à-vis private military and security
companies
- Each State party bears responsibility for the military and
security activities of PMSCs registered or operating in their
jurisdiction, whether or not these entities are contracted by the
State.
- Each State party must ensure that the PMSCs it has contracted
are trained in and respect international human rights and
international humanitarian law.
- No State Party can delegate or outsource inherently State
functions to PMSCs.
- Each State Party shall take such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to establish procedures for contracting
PMSCs, licensing procedures for the export and import of
military and security personnel and services; and the effective
customs and other forms of control over export/import and reexport/re-import of firearms used by PMSCs.
- Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic law, shall take
legislative and other measures required to introduce full or
partial prohibition on the delegation or outsourcing of military
and/or security services. (Art.4)



Rule of law
- Each State Party shall ensure that PMSCs, their personnel and
any structures related to their activities perform their respective
functions under officially enacted laws consistent with
international human rights and humanitarian law.
- Each State Party shall take such legislative, administrative and
other measures as may be necessary to ensure that PMSCs and
their personnel are held accountable for violations of applicable
national or international law.
- Each State Party shall ensure that any contract or agreement
between the State party and a PMSC on provision of military
and/or security services entered into by a PMSC as well as its
employees is in accordance with international law and is
consistent with the legislation of the home State, the contracting
State, the state of operations and third States whose nationals
are employed to work for a PMSC under this contract. (Art.5)
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State sovereignty
- States parties shall ensure that PMSCs under no circumstances
carry out activities that undermine the sovereignty of another
State, its territorial integrity and/or that contravene to the
principle of sovereign equality and obligation of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other States and the
principle of self-determination of peoples.
- Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in
the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and
performance of inherently State functions under international as
well as domestic laws. (Art.6)



Respect and protection of international human rights and
humanitarian law
- Each State Party shall take legislative, judicial, administrative
and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that PMSCs
and their personnel are held accountable in accordance with this
Convention and to ensure respect for, and protection of
international human rights and humanitarian law.
- Each State party shall ensure that PMSCs and their personnel
apply due diligence to ensure that their activities do not
contribute directly or indirectly to violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law.
- Superiors of PMSC personnel, such as:
a. governmental officials, whether they are military
commanders or civilian superiors, or
b. directors or managers of PMSCs,
may be liable for crimes under international law committed by
PMSC personnel under their effective authority and control, as
a result of their failure to properly exercise control over them, in
accordance with the rules of international law. No clause in a
contract shall be interpreted as evading superiors’ responsibility
under international law. (Art.7)



Prohibition of the use of force
- Each State party shall take such legislative, administrative and
other measures as may be necessary to make it illegal for and
prohibit PMSCs and their personnel to directly participate in
hostilities, terrorist acts and military actions aimed at, or which
States have grounds for suspecting would result in the
overthrow of a government; the coercive change of
internationally acknowledged borders of the State; the violation
of sovereignty; explicitly targeting civilians or causing
disproportionate harm;
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Each State party shall ensure that the activities of PMSCs and
their personnel do not cause or exacerbate inter or intra-state
warfare or conflict;
Each State party shall ensure that PMSCs and their personnel do
not provide training that could facilitate its client’s direct
participation in hostilities, terrorist acts and military actions.
(Art.8)



Prohibition of delegation and/or outsourcing inherently State
functions
- Each State Party shall define and limit the scope of activities of
PMSCs and specifically prohibit the outsourcing to PMSCs of
functions which are defined as inherently State functions.
(Art.9)



Prohibition of outsourcing the use of certain arms
- Each State Party, without prejudice to its respective
conventional obligations, has the duty to respect the principles
of international humanitarian law such as the “basic rules” on
the prohibition of certain methods and means of warfare as set
out in art. 35 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, that refers to the prohibition of weapons
which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or
which are to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment.
- Each State party shall take such legislative, administrative and
other measures as may be necessary to prevent PMSCs and their
personnel from using weapons likely to adversely and/or
irreversibly damage the environment on a massive scale.
- Each State Party shall take such legislative, judicial,
administrative and other measures as may be necessary to
ensure that PMSCs and their personnel under no circumstances
use, threaten to use and/or engage in any activities related to
nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological and toxin
weapons, their components and carriers. (Art.10)



Prohibition of illegal acquisition, illegal possession or trafficking of
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.
Each State Party shall establish and maintain an
effective system of licensing or other authorization, which
prohibits PMSCs, their personnel and any sub-contracted
personnel from trafficking in firearms, their parts, components
or ammunition.
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary to ensure that its licensing or authorization
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procedures are robust and secure and that the authenticity of
licensing or authorization documents can be independently
verified or validated.
Each State party shall regulate the possession and use of
firearms by personnel of PMSCs inside the premises of the
client they have been contracted to protect, and to restrict them
from possession and use of firearms outside the limits of the
premises in which they have been contracted to provide
security. (Art.11)

National legislative regulation, oversight and monitoring:


Specific legislative regulation
- Each State Party shall develop and adopt national legislation to
adequately and effectively regulate the activities of PMSCs.
(Art.12)



National regime of regulation and oversight
- Each State Party shall establish a comprehensive domestic
regime of regulation and oversight over the activities in its
territory of PMSCs and their personnel including all foreign
personnel, in order to prohibit and investigate illegal activities
as defined by this Convention as well as by relevant national
laws;
- States Parties shall apply practical measures for sharing
information on companies providing military and security
services outside their territories and for establishing control
over the provision of such services, as consistent with the
safeguards aimed at ensuring the proper use of information
without impeding their legal implementation in any way.
- States Parties shall endeavor to develop and encourage global,
regional, sub-regional and bilateral cooperation among judicial
bodies and law enforcement agencies as well as financial
regulation bodies in order to monitor and control any use of
force by PMSCs.
- States Parties shall investigate reports of violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights norms by
private military companies and private security companies and
ensure civil and criminal prosecution and punishment of
offenders.
- States Parties shall take appropriate action against companies
that commit human rights violations or engage in any criminal
activity, inter alia by revoking their licenses and reporting to
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the Committee on the record of activities of these companies.
(Art.13)


Licensing
- Each State Party shall take such legislative, judicial,
administrative and other measures as may be necessary to
ensure that PMSCs and their personnel carry out their activities
exclusively under the respective licences and authorizations.
- Each State party shall ensure that all licenses and authorizations
issued to PMSCs and their personnel shall be registered in the
general Registry of the State and shall be granted following a
transparent and open procedure.
- Each State Party shall establish criteria to grant licenses and
authorizations to PMSCs, taking into account in particular any
records or reports of human rights violations committed by the
companies, providing and/or ensuring training in international
human rights and humanitarian law and the existence of robust
due diligence measures. (Art.14)



Licensing import and export of military and/or security services
- Each State Party shall take such legislative, judicial,
administrative and other measures as may be required to ensure
that PMSCs and their personnel import and export their services
only under the respective licences and authorizations.
- Each State Party which imports or exports private military and
security services shall publicize their scope and activities and
keep the Committee informed about its licensing regime as well
as provide regular and up-dated information on any changes and
supplements to the import or export of these services, including
details of any subsidiaries or holding companies of the PMSC in
question. (Art.15)



Registration and accountability
- Each State Party shall take such legislative, judicial,
administrative and other measures as may be necessary to
establish:
a. Specific and obligatory procedures on governmental
registration of PMSCs;
b. Specific legal requirements for persons employed by
PMSCs concerning inter alia their training and
experience;
c. A ban on the registration of PMSCs in offshore zones.
- Each State Party shall establish and maintain a general State
Registry of PMSCs operating in their jurisdiction, including
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information on any subsidiaries or holding companies of each
registered PMSC.
Each State Party shall identify or establish a governmental body
responsible for the registration of PMSCs and exercise
oversight over their activities. (Art.16)



State obligations vis-à-vis PMSCs and their personnel
- Each State Party shall ensure that all PMSCs registered or
operating on its territory comply with fundamental international
labour standards.
- Each State party shall ensure that personnel of PMSCs are
professionally trained to respect relevant international human
rights law and international humanitarian law.
- Each State Party shall ensure that PMSCs personnel must be
professionally trained and vetted according to the applicable
international standards, in particular regarding the use of
specific equipment and firearms.
- Each State Party shall ensure that personnel of PMSCs strictly
adhere to relevant norms of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, including through prompt
investigation, prosecution and punishment of violations of
human rights and humanitarian law.
- Each State Party shall ensure that the personnel of PMSCs
providing military and security services in the territory of a
foreign country undertake to respect the sovereignty and laws of
the country of operations. (Art.17)



Regulation of the use of force and firearms
- Each State Party shall establish rules on the use of force and
firearms by the personnel of PMSCs.
- State parties shall ensure that in providing military and security
services, employees of PMSCs shall, as far as possible, apply
non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and
firearms.
- In providing military and security services, employees may use
force or firearms only (a) to defend him/herself or other
employees of the company against what he/she believes to be an
imminent unlawful threat of death or serious body injury, in
respect of the exercise of the essential right of self-defense; (b)
to defend persons whom he/she is under a contract to protect
against what he/she believes to be an imminent unlawful threat
of death or serious body injury; (c) to resist what he/she
reasonably believes to be an attempt to unlawfully abduct
him/her, other employees of the company or a person whom
he/she is under contract to protect; (d) to prevent or put a stop to
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the commission of a serious crime that would involve or
involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.
Each State party shall ensure that all incidents involving the use
of force and firearms by PMSCs are promptly reported to the
competent State bodies and ensure appropriate investigation of
the incident by competent authorities. (Art.18)

State responsibility to impose criminal, civil and/or administrative
sanctions on offenders and provide remedies to victims


Criminal, civil and/or administrative offenses in the sphere of
private military and security services
- Each State Party shall ensure that the acts of carrying out
inherently State functions are offenses under its national law.
- Each State Party shall ensure that the unlawful use of force and
firearms, unlawful use of certain arms and illicit trafficking in
arms by PMSCs and their personnel are punished as criminal
offenses under its national law.
- Each State party shall ensure that all activities of PMSCs
occurring without the required license and authorization,
including the export and import of military and security services
are offenses under its national law.
- Each State party shall take such legislative, judicial,
administrative and other measures to ensure, in accordance with
their obligations under international human rights law,
international criminal law and international humanitarian law,
that individual criminal responsibility is established and that
PMSCs and their personnel are held accountable for any
violations of the law, that no recourse is taken to immunity
agreements, and that effective remedies are provided to victims.
- In relation to imposing penalties for offenses listed in this
article, due consideration should be paid to offenses committed
against vulnerable groups. (Art.19)



Liability of legal persons and entities
- Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be
necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish
the liability of legal persons and entities for the offenses
established in accordance with this Convention.
- Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability
of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative, or
a combination of these
- Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal
liability of the natural persons who have actually committed
the offenses.

73

74

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

2011

- Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons
held liable in accordance with this convention are subject to
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or noncriminal sanctions.(Art.20)


Establishment of jurisdiction
- Each State party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction through its domestic law over the
offenses set out in this convention, when (a) the offense is
committed in the territory of that State; (b) the offence is
committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an
aircraft registered under the laws of that State at the time the
offence is committed; or (c) the offense is committed by a
national of that State.
- A State party may also establish its jurisdiction over any of the
offenses set out in the convention when (a) the offense is
committed against a national of that State; or (b) the offense is
committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual
residence in the territory of that State;
- This Convention does not exclude any additional criminal
jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.(Art.21)



Obligations related to prosecution
- Each State party shall take such measures as are necessary to
investigate, prosecute and punish violations of the present
Convention, and to ensure effective remedies to victims.
- Each State party, in the interests of justice, shall take such
measures as necessary to ensure that no immunity agreement
from prosecution for PMSCs and their personnel for violations
of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law are enforced.
- The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a
person alleged to have committed any offense referred to this
convention is found, shall in the cases contemplated in article
21, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. (Art.23)



Extradition
- To the extent that the crimes set out in the convention are not
mentioned specifically in any extradition treaty existing
between States parties, they shall be deemed to be included as
extraditable offenses in the treaty. States parties undertake to
include such offenses as extraditable offenses in every
extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded by them.
(Art.24)
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Mutual legal assistance
- The States Parties shall afford one another mutual legal
assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial
proceedings in relation to the offenses covered by this
Convention. (Art.25)



Transfer of criminal proceedings
- States parties may transfer to one another proceedings for the
prosecution of offenses under this convention in cases where
such transfer is considered to be in the interests of the proper
administration of justice.(Art.26)



International Fund for the rehabilitation of victims
- States parties shall consider establishing an international Fund
to be administered by the Secretary-General to provide
reparation to victims of offenses under this Convention and /or
assist in their rehabilitation;
- The establishment of such a Fund shall be without prejudice to
the obligation of PMSCs and/or the individuals criminally liable
to directly compensate victims of violations. (Art.28)

International Oversight and Monitoring


Committee on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of
PMSCs
- For the purpose of reviewing the application of the Convention,
there shall be established a Committee on the Regulation,
Oversight and Monitoring of PMSCs. (Art.29)
International Register of PMSCs
States Parties request the Committee to establish and maintain
an International Register of PMSCs operating on the
international market, based on information provided by States
parties.
Each State Party shall provide annually for the Register data on
imports and exports of military and security services of PMSCs
and standardized information on PMSCs registered in and
licensed by the State Party. (Art.30)
Reports by State parties
Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, for consideration by the Committee, a
report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other
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measures which they have adopted and which give effect to the
provisions of this Convention. ( Art. 31)
Inquiry Procedure
If the Committee receives reliable information indicating grave
or systematic violations of the provisions set forth in this
Convention, the Committee shall invite the State where the
offenses have been reported to have occurred and/or the State of
registration of the PMSC reportedly involved in such offenses
to co-operate in the examination of the information and to this
end to submit observations with regard to the information
concerned.
Taking into account any observations which may have been
submitted by the State(s) concerned as well as any other
relevant information available to it, the Committee may, if it
decides that this is warranted, designate one or more of its
members to make a confidential inquiry and to report to the
Committee urgently. (Art.33)
Complaints against Parties
- A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under
this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee
to receive and consider communications to the effect that a
State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its
obligations under this Convention. (Art.34)
Conciliation Commission
-

If a matter referred to the Committee is not resolved to the
satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the Committee may,
with the prior consent of the States Parties concerned, appoint
an ad hoc Conciliation Commission. The members of the
Commission shall be appointed with the unanimous consent of
the parties to the dispute, and its good offices shall be made
available to the States concerned with a view to an amicable
solution of the matter on the basis of respect for this
Convention. (Art.35)

Individual and Group Petitions
- A State Party may at the time of ratification of this Convention
or at any time afterwards declare that it recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its
jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by this State
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Party of provisions of this Convention. The Committee shall not
admit any communication concerning a State Party which has
not made such a declaration. (Art.37)
Final provisions



Standard provisions regarding signature, entry into force, amendment,
denunciation, reservations, conference of States parties, depository and
languages. (Art. 40 to 49)
Intergovernmental organizations
- Intergovernmental organizations shall declare, in their
instruments of formal confirmation or accession, the extent of
their competence with respect to matters governed by the
present Convention.
- References to "States Parties" in the present Convention shall
apply to such organizations within the limits of their
competence
- Inter-governmental organizations, in matters within their
competence, may exercise their right to vote in the Meeting of
States Parties. (Art.42)
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ANNEX II: HRC RESOLUTION 15/22
Open-ended intergovernmental working group to
consider the possibility of elaborating an
international regulatory framework on the
regulation, monitoring and oversight of the
activities of private military and security companies
The Human Rights Council,
Guided by the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling all previous resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly, the Council and the Commission on
Human Rights on the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the
right of peoples to self-determination, including
General Assembly resolution 62/145 of 18 December
2007,
1. Takes note with appreciation the broad
consultations held by the Working Group on the use of
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to selfdetermination, including the various regional
governmental consultations for States on traditional
and new forms of mercenary activities as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the
right of peoples to self-determination, in particular
regarding the effects of the activities of private military
and security companies on the enjoyment of human
rights;
2. Also takes note with appreciation the broad
consultation process undertaken by the Working Group
regarding the content and scope of a possible draft
convention on private companies offering military
assistance, consultancy and other military and securityrelated services on the international market, including a
series of regional governmental consultations and
consultations with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions and
experts;
3. Further takes note of the principles and main
elements of the proposed draft convention on private
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military and security companies presented by the
Working Group, as contained in its report; 240
4. Decides, for purposes of transparency and
inclusivity,
to
establish
an
open-ended
intergovernmental working group with the mandate to
consider the possibility of elaborating an international
regulatory framework, including inter alia, the option
of elaborating a legally binding instrument on the
regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of
private military and security companies, including their
accountability, taking into consideration the principles,
main elements and draft text as proposed by the
Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means
of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of
the right of peoples to self-determination;
5. Also decides that the open-ended intergovernmental
working group shall hold a session of five working
days a year for a period of two years, and that its first
session shall take place no later than May 2011;
6. Further
decides
that
the
open-ended
intergovernmental working group shall present its
recommendations at its twenty first session;
7. Affirms the importance of providing the
intergovernmental open-ended working group with the
necessary expertise and expert advice to fulfill its
mandate, and decides that the members of the Working
Group on the use of mercenaries who were involved in
the elaboration of the principles, main elements and
draft text for a possible convention shall participate in
the intergovernmental open-ended working group as
resource persons;
8. Requests the Secretary-General and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to
provide the intergovernmental open-ended working
group with all the financial and human resources
necessary for the fulfilment of its mandate.

240

Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 5, 2010) (by José Luis Gómez del Prado).
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